John Mason is a Member of the Scottish Parliament from Glasgow. He is known for his principled stance and willingness to speak openly on controversial matters. Formerly a member of the Scottish National Party, he now serves as an independent politician. In this interview, Mason reflects on the challenges of modern politics, his core values, and why independence and integrity matter more to him than party loyalty. 

Mr. John Mason is the godparent of Mikalai Khila,  Belarusian political prisoner and Christian who was recently released from prison and immediately deported to Lithuania. We spoke to John shortly before this event.

Natallia Harkovich (NH): Why is it important for you to act as the godparent for one of the political prisoners in a Belarusian prison?

John Mason MSP (JM):  I am convinced that the Bible’s teaching is God’s teaching. This is why the Church is one body all over the world. Even if we have never met, we are like a family — brothers and sisters. Obviously, we can’t know everybody everywhere, but when there are opportunities to connect with someone, it’s a good idea. I lived in Nepal, where the Church was not exactly persecuted but still faced a lot of pressure. That experience developed in me an interest and sensitivity to such situations.

I became involved in a group in the Scottish Parliament with a particular focus on freedom of religion or belief. There I came across many individual cases — that’s how I got linked in with you. There is a limit to what any one person can do, but I pray and occasionally write to someone like Mikalai.

NH: How does your belief motivate you as a political actor?

JM: There are a lot of reasons why I’m in politics. I was in the Scottish National Party because I want Scottish independence, just like Belarusians want their independence. There’s a small number of us in the Scottish Parliament who are committed Christian believers. We strongly believe that the Church is one body worldwide. And just like with our physical body — if one part hurts, the whole body is affected.

The Church in Belarus and the Church in Scotland are one Church. Though we haven’t met or don’t know each other personally, they are still part of me. We are affected if others suffer, are persecuted, live in poverty, or starve. Of course, the Church doesn’t always get it right, and we don’t always care enough; instead, we can become very focused on our own matters.

There are a lot of needs in Glasgow and the rest of Scotland, but we should at least be aware and, I believe, pray more for the people in Belarus and elsewhere. We can use social media to raise awareness, with good input from Forum 18¹, which focuses on the ex-Soviet world. And we write letters. That’s just how things have worked out for me — to have these individual links as godparents to prisoners.

NH: What is most important or most painful for you when watching the Belarusian situation from afar?

JM: I feel for the church leaders and Christians there. I can see how difficult it is for them to know the right thing to do. They are under a lot of pressure, and being imprisoned may not always be the best course. In China, for many years, some Christians have worked more closely with the government in state-approved churches, both Catholic and others, while others maintained underground or informal unregistered churches and refused to work with the government. Sometimes there are tensions between Christians over this.

I feel for them. In Nepal we were not allowed to do certain things — how far could you push the boundaries? I’m sure it’s hard for many of them. Some will just follow the government no matter what. Some may be very antagonistic and do their own thing. But I’m sure there are many believers in the middle, including church leaders, who are really struggling to discern what is right. Even within churches and families they may disagree.

I feel for them, and that’s why I pray for them — for wisdom. The Bible tells us to pray for wisdom, and I do. Not every believer in Belarus needs to act in exactly the same way. We don’t need all the believers in prison. We need some people outside, perhaps being a little more careful. But it’s a hard position to be in.

NH: We know about the persecution of believers in the Soviet Union, and now we see a new type of persecution. When did you first recognise this new wave?

JM: I grew up during the Cold War, when there was clear persecution of Christian believers throughout the Communist world. And although the Soviet Union seemed to have opened up, in countries like China it has continued. We see, according to the organisation Open Doors², that North Korea is the worst, and has been for a very long time.

The persecution of Christian believers varies around the world; it comes and goes in different countries. When I was growing up, it was very much about the Communist countries and their persecution. More recently, the focus has shifted to some Muslim-majority countries — Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, even Pakistan — where Christians have suffered most.

Through your organisation and others like Forum 18, it’s become clear that in the former Soviet countries, certainly in Belarus but also in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the requirement for church registration makes things very difficult. Sadly, persecution of Christians is continuing in many places.

NH: What would you consider the most significant successes of your political activity?

JM: One of the things I believe I’m meant to do is to challenge the establishment. I do that locally, for the whole of Scotland, and would do it anywhere in the world if the opportunity arose. I’ve been in politics since 1998 — for the last 27 years. I like to think I’ve asked a lot of the right questions.

Sometimes there’s great importance in asking questions. Everybody can stand up and shout about what is wrong, and there is a lot of wrong in the world. But asking questions and making people think affects those you’re talking to. Asking questions that maybe others don’t ask — that’s the kind of space I think I’ve occupied and, I hope, where I’ve had some impact and success over the years.

NH: Thank you very much for your time, for sharing and for your support of Christians in Belarus.

1. Forum 18 is a Norwegian human rights organization that promotes religious freedom. The organization’s name is based on Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Forum 18 summarizes the article as: The right to believe, to worship and witness; the right to change one’s belief or religion; the right to join together and express one’s belief. The Christian Vision for Belarus is in contact with this human rights organisation (see, for example the material “BELARUS: Police take relatives’ DNA after KGB declares religious freedom group “extremist”” May, 7th, 2025). ︎
2. Open Doors is a global, non-denominational Christian organization founded in 1955 to support persecuted Christians worldwide by providing Bibles, Christian literature, discipleship training, and practical aid like emergency relief and livelihood support. ︎

At a press conference held shortly after his release, Krylou drew public and media attention to the situation of these two clergy members, emphasizing the urgent need for their release. In an interview with Christian Vision, he described in detail the conditions of their imprisonment, the fabricated charges of treason against Fr. Okolotowicz, and the attempts by the KGB to pressure him — in particular, to involve him in a provocation against the Apostolic Nuncio to Belarus, Archbishop Ignazio Ceffalia. Fr. Okolotowicz was arrested after being lured to a cemetery near Valožyn, where he was told he would perform a funeral rite. He himself stated that he considers himself a hostage: “I am here for my faith in God.”

– Yesterday, during the press conference of recently released political prisoners, you mentioned that you met Catholic priests who are also political prisoners while in detention. Were they Fr. Henryk Okolotowicz and Fr. Andrzej Juchniewicz, or someone else?

Yes, that’s right — two Catholic priests, both political prisoners: Fr. Henryk Okolotowicz and Fr. Andrzej Juchniewicz. They are both held in Penal Colony No. 2 in Babruysk.

But I know more about Okolotowicz.

I didn’t manage to speak with Andrzej — he has a “low status” in prison.

He’s being held under articles related to sexual violence — something from Article 166, 167, maybe 168 or 169, I can’t recall the exact charges. That status in prison is what they call the “lowest caste” — the so-called petukhi (literally “roosters”). I want to clarify: in our colony, there’s no actual sexual violence happening. Only in extreme situations, maybe the KGB instigates something through the worst inmates. But no, there’s no systematic sexual assault of man by another man.

Andrzej is a kind, gentle man. But he was always separated from me — by other inmates of that status. Whenever I tried to approach him, others would immediately say: “Why are you talking to him? What do you want from him?”  Perhaps they were trying to protect him, maybe they thought I wanted to speak with him as an aggressor. I don’t know.

So I can only really speak about Okolotowicz.

– Did Fr. Henryk tell you how and why he was detained? What happened?

According to him, someone called his phone and told him a woman had died and asked him to perform a Catholic funeral rite at the cemetery. They said the coffin would be brought there, people would be present, and that he would be paid at the cemetery after the service.

He went to the cemetery — this was near Valožyn, where his parish is located — and saw several minivans parked, with people standing around. These people, as it turned out, were KGB agents, wearing trench coats. Five or six people, maybe, some vans.

And so he arrived and saw some minivans parked at the cemetery. This was in Valožyn, somewhere near Valožyn, in the vicinity of Valožyn — his parish was in Valožyn. The parish was in Valožyn, and therefore the parishioners were from Valožyn. So he arrived at the cemetery as instructed, and there were some vans, people were there, but — as it turned out later — these people were KGB agents. They were standing in trench coats at the cemetery, maybe five or six of them, maybe a couple of vans, I don’t know exactly.

He approached them and asked, like: “Where’s the coffin? Who’s being buried? What is this?” And they replied: “There’s no funeral here, you’re here for other reasons,” and so on. And then they took him. I don’t remember exactly how. There were a lot of men, and he was alone, already 60 years old. So, they took him — I can’t say for sure, but they most likely put him in handcuffs and put a black helmet on his head, so no one could recognize him, so no one could try to free him or attack the van to rescue him. That’s exactly why they do it — so that no one can see who is being taken, where, and by whom.

– What exactly was he charged with? What does the accusation of “treason” mean in his case?

According to him, the essence of the accusation — they charged him, and in the verdict it says that he caused material damage in the amount of one million euros. They took away the cars from his parish, including the car he drove to the cemetery, and everything that the Vatican had given him — some funds, transferred to him, I don’t know exactly, maybe it’s his assumption, but they took about 250, 270, maybe 280 thousand euros from him.

So, that part is clear. Then, during that period, he received a document stating that — taking into account the money we’ve already confiscated from you — out of the one million euros, you still need to pay the remaining amount in Belarusian rubles, which came out to about one million seven hundred and eighty Belarusian rubles. At that time, the euro was about 4 rubles, so you need to convert it to understand how much is left to pay.

And the accusation against Okolotowicz, according to him, was something like this: supposedly, he made some airplanes that flew off somewhere to change direction — for what reason, I don’t know — and he supposedly directed those Russian and Belarusian airplanes to fly in some other, opposite direction.

And in doing so, he supposedly committed a crime — what’s it called — the crime of treason against the state. He allegedly redirected the military, aircraft, and the whole air force in the opposite direction from where they were supposed to go. Somehow, he supposedly launched all the planes of Russia and Belarus, and they flew off on some kind of complex mission. What kind of accusation is that?

Officers from the KGB came to see him — most likely to try to force him to denounce his parishioners or other Catholic clergy.

And in the summer, they took him — by prison transfer — probably for 3 or 4 weeks, to Minsk, to the KGB pre-trial detention center. There, they gave him some documents to read, and apparently asked him to sign them — something like a court-related acknowledgment. But the transfer itself, this whole transport process — it’s incredibly stressful, seriously traumatic. As they say, two moves are equal to one fire, and one prison transfer is like ten fires. It really hits your nerves.

So they brought him there to sign some document — most likely a court paper. Some document that, they said, couldn’t be sent by mail or courier because it was a top-secret document of great importance, so they had to bring him in person.

This all happened over the course of June.

And now I’ll tell you what happened afterward. After he returned — about a month later — back to Penal Colony No. 2 in Babruysk, they called him in again. They told him that KGB officers would come to speak with him.

And the conversation went like this. They said, “You owe us a million euros. You understand yourself that this stuff with the airplanes and the million euros — it has as much to do with you as I have to do with ballet. It’s all nonsense, you know that. But just sign these papers, and we’ll let you go. We’re not asking anything else from you.”

And the documents — this is what Okolotowicz himself told me — contained approximately the following: The KGB was requesting that once he was reinstated as a priest in Valožyn, he should invite the Vatican’s ambassador — the Apostolic Nuncio — to visit him, and then secretly, as if “by accident,” hand the nuncio a flash drive. In other words, they wanted to fabricate a kompromat operation against the nuncio.But Okolotowicz refused.

He said he told them: “Look, I’ve studied for fifteen to eighteen years just to become a priest. I’ve even defended a doctoral dissertation. During my training and internships, I served in nearly every country in Europe. I served right here in Babrujsk for ten years. I’ve been serving in Valožyn for fifteen. Everything in me is focused on the work of the Church and of God. My whole mind is filled with God. And what you’re asking of me — that’s a crime. I cannot betray God, just as I cannot carry out what you’re asking.” But they told him: “We will come back to you many more times — maybe you’ll change your mind. Maybe you’ll agree to do it.”

– What are his conditions in the colony?

He’s holding up — doing okay. He’s got some health issues, I don’t remember exactly what. But I want to say — he’s staying strong, he’s holding on. The pain isn’t too severe. But he really needs to be released.

He’s a great man, really, a person of high standing.

He’s not being badly harassed in the colony by the staff — although they could, for example, deliberately accuse you of not greeting properly, of not following the required format: “Comrade Officer, I am so-and-so, born in such-and-such year, convicted under such-and-such article, registered under the profile ‘extremist and other destructive activity.’”

He can request to go to the medical unit, and they do let him in. He’s ill with something, has some kind of dietary issues or restrictions. But he receives all the required products, everything allowed under the regime provisions.

As with all political prisoners, only relatives are allowed to write to him. He was banned from correspondence — I don’t remember for how many years, he told me once, but I didn’t memorize it, didn’t need to. From the time he was detained, the first letter from his brother eventually arrived — maybe after a year, maybe two, I’m not sure exactly. That was the first letter that reached him after his arrest. Then, a couple of weeks later, a second letter arrived — just an empty envelope. And a few days later, I saw the officer, Astreyka, hand him the actual letter. It had supposedly been “misplaced,” but in reality, they had inspected it — to see what his brother had written.

That letter — Fr. Henryk told me himself — said that somewhere in Nigeria or some other place, a Catholic priest had been detained. They tried to deport him, but he refused to leave, and he was sentenced — 26 years. Then the Vatican fought for him, and eventually — after about a year — they managed to get him released and expelled from the country. The Vatican managed to push that through only after a year. There was also some other valuable information in the letter, but I don’t remember what it was.

That’s the kind of man Okolotowicz is — he doesn’t really petition for himself.

If someone has connections in the Department of Corrections (DIN) or tries to file a complaint with them, they often get punished in retaliation — because they went over the heads of the local administration. But the recent trend is: if someone complains to higher authorities, they become untouchable. The staff are afraid to mess with them, so they stop inventing punishments. Normally, they’ll say something like: you weren’t shaved properly — even if you were. Or that you smoked in an unauthorized place — that’s what they do to people registered under the “tenth profile” (that’s what they call political prisoners — not “political prisoners,” but “tenth profile”: “extremist and other destructive activity”).

Usually the officer will call you in and say: “Write a statement saying you smoked in an unauthorized place. Or that you weren’t properly shaved. Write that you have bad eyesight and couldn’t see in the mirror. Or make something up — say you didn’t greet me. Just write something. Some violation. Whatever you want. Whatever’s better.” And so people write.

Everything is just covered in lies.

The system is massively bloated. There are too many staff, and they don’t do anything — they just pick on everyone, nitpick constantly, walk around trying to catch someone doing something. And they’re all scared of each other — scared for their ranks. When a higher-level inspection team arrives, they panic ten times, a hundred times more. They climb fences, crawl through mesh wiring — just to avoid running into them. If a commission is coming — two, five people — and there’s no gate nearby to escape through, they’ll climb through barbed wire just to avoid crossing paths. God forbid someone from the commission asks them a question they can’t answer — then they’ll be fired. They’re all idiots, frankly. Kind of dim. I mean the staff — the prison administration, the DIN people. The smarter ones don’t last long — they leave.

– Is he allowed to communicate with others or speak about faith? What about religious life in the colony?

No one ever prohibited me from speaking with him, and no one else was forbidden from approaching him either.

He gives advice — in a morally uplifting, spiritually beautiful way.

He says, for example, that one shouldn’t smoke, because, you know, there are people who already lose their grip on reality, who become unstable, and if they also smoke, it just destroys their brain even more. So, he gives this kind of advice — not in a pushy way, but as suggestions, if someone wants to hear it. And there was also this one guy — a Ministry of Internal Affairs officer, I think — who came up to him and said, “I remember when I was young — you were the one who married me.”

As for religious life, there is an Orthodox church on the grounds of Penal Colony No. 2. But political prisoners are strictly prohibited from attending.

Some convicted prisoners are allowed to go there if they’re registered. Many want to — there are lots of Catholics in the colony, I can tell you that. Many Catholics are convicted under various articles — murderers, fraudsters, and so on — but by religion, they are Catholics. They go to one particular spot, where it’s closer to the church, and at certain times every day, the bell rings three times — our Orthodox church bell. When the bell rings, the Catholics stand still, make the sign of the cross, and silently say their prayers. I also know that there are some Catholics who, in the morning, go stand in a corner of the exercise yard. That’s the local outdoor area — a fenced-off zone where we’re allowed to walk. And they stand there in the corner, silently praying. Of course, some of them approach the priest as well — they say Catholic prayers, they pray to God, to the Lord.

Henryk asked if he could attend that Orthodox church — or if he could at least be allowed to lead services, so that Catholic believers who wanted to could come to him. They told him this is absolutely forbidden.

That if even ordinary prisoners on the “political profile” are not allowed to attend the church, then a priest — all the more so — is not allowed to conduct anything.

People actually treat him quite well, by the way. But, as the priest explained to me, the way the state sees it is this: if Poland is arming itself, then Poland is an enemy — and therefore the Catholic Church is an enemy too. And the state believes it should push the Catholic Church out of Belarus just like Ukraine is now trying to push the Russian Orthodox Church out of Ukraine. That’s the tendency. And that’s why they organize all these setups and provocations.

– Did Fr. Okolotowicz submit a request for a pardon?

I don’t know for sure about a pardon. But

I doubt he could have submitted one — because he deeply believes that, as a convicted person, he is in fact a hostage, a captive. As he said: “I am here for my faith in God.”

– Why did you choose to draw attention specifically to the Catholic priests at the press conference?

Okolotowicz knew that I would soon be released — as of today, September 13, I had sixty days left to serve. And

he said: “Make every effort so that the media learn about all of this, so that everyone writes about it, so that attention is drawn to how many people have been unjustly convicted.”

He’s a person of high standing — a Doctor of Theology, studied for fifteen years, taught. He said that the only thing that can help is pressure. Not on the state of Belarus — but on the regime, which is a criminal one.

The only thing they fear is publicity — the media. That’s the only kind of pressure that works.

The world must be told, the Vatican must be told, so that they act, so that they help free people. The regime must be made to fear.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The constitution grants the freedom to profess and practice any religious belief but prohibits religious activities directed against the sovereignty of the state, its constitutional system, and “civic harmony.” A concordat grants the Belarusian Orthodox Church (BOC) rights and privileges not granted to other religious groups, and the law recognizes the “determining role of the BOC” and historical importance of the “traditional faiths” of Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, and evangelical Lutheranism. The law prohibits all religious activity by unregistered groups and requires all registered religious groups to obtain permits to proselytize or hold events outside of their premises, as well as prior approval from the authorities to import and distribute religious literature.

Authorities continued to use laws regulating “mass events” to target members of the clergy and members of religious groups engaged in the prodemocracy movement that emerged following the 2020 fraudulent presidential election, as well as those groups protesting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Authorities detained numerous religious leaders in connection with these 2020 and 2022 protests, including a religious education teacher at the Roman Catholic cathedral in Minsk. The teacher remained in pretrial detention at year’s end on criminal charges of inciting religious and social hatred, accused of using the cathedral towers to monitor the movements of security forces and warn protesters. The regime detained religious leaders for posting on social media materials deemed extremist, such as democratic opposition symbols, and leading prayers in support of volunteer fighters defending Ukraine. A law signed in late December and scheduled to take effect in July 2024 mandates religious groups reregister within a year and bans registered religious groups from engaging in political activities or supporting and financing political parties. The new law expands the grounds for shutting down religious communities and organizations, including terrorism, extremism, or acting against the sovereignty of the country. In June, authorities prosecuted and ultimately fined a Baptist pastor for publicly proselytizing without authorization. Human rights organizations said authorities restricted clergy access to prisons and denied pastoral visits to some political prisoners. According to observers, authorities continued surveillance of registered and unregistered religious groups, including through monitoring of social media. In June, Minsk city authorities bulldozed a building formerly owned by the evangelical Christian New Life Church following a years-long dispute with tax authorities. In October, following government accusations that information on the church’s social media accounts regarding the political and social situation in the country was extremist, a Minsk court shut down the church and revoked its registration, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court in December. The Catholic Church of St. Simon and St. Helena in Minsk remained closed following a 2022 fire that church leaders said did not do extensive damage; a Minsk city official said in October that repair and restoration work would start in 2024, after which the government would decide on the group’s request to allow reopening of the church.

According to media reports, on December 20, Plenipotentiary Representative for Religious and Nationality Affairs Alyaksandr Rumak and head of the Ideology Department of the Minsk city executive committee Volha Chamadanava warned the BOC Diocese of Minsk clergy against engaging in political activity, demonstrating any opposition or extremist symbols in churches, and praying for the victory of Ukraine, threatening them with criminal prosecution.

In the wake of the Israel-Hamas conflict, there were numerous antisemitic comments circulating on social media. Following the arrival of a November evacuation flight from Israel, hundreds of commentators urged the government against welcoming the evacuees and questioned the loyalty and patriotism of those evacuated. Other social media commentary included derogatory references to the Jewish identity of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. An interreligious working group comprising the largest religious groups organized multiple seminars on issues related to religion and society.

The Charge d’Affaires and other U.S. embassy personnel engaged with religious leaders and civil society activists on religious freedom issues, including registration of religious communities, state pressure on clergy, freedom to express and practice religious beliefs, freedom of expression for clergy who participated in activities authorities considered political, and antisemitism. The Chargé and other embassy personnel met with Jewish groups to discuss antisemitism and the preservation of Jewish cultural heritage and participated in a November event in Minsk commemorating Holocaust victims. The Chargé and other embassy representatives also engaged Orthodox Christians, Roman Catholics, Protestants, and other groups as well as civil society activists, to learn about their religious activities and to discuss the regime’s actions affecting the exercise of religious freedom.

Section I.

Religious Demography

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 9.5 million (midyear 2023). According to a 2016 survey by the state Information and Analytical Center of the Presidential Administration (the most recent data available), approximately 53 percent of the adult population belongs to the BOC, 6 percent to the Roman Catholic Church, 8 percent is atheist, and 22 percent answered “uncertain.” Smaller religious groups together constituting approximately 2 percent of the population include Jews (approximately 30,000), Muslims (approximately 20,000), Greek Catholics (members of the Belarusian Greek Catholic Church), Old Believers (priestist and priestless), members of the Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and other Orthodox Christian groups, Lutherans (approximately 1,500), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Apostolic Christians, Presbyterians and members of other Protestant groups, Armenian Apostolics, Latin Catholics, members of the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Baha’is, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and Buddhists. Most ethnic Poles, who constitute approximately 2 percent of the population, are Roman Catholic.

Section II.

Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The constitution grants individuals the freedom to profess or not to profess and to spread any religious belief and to participate in acts of worship and religious rituals and rites that are not prohibited by law. It stipulates all faiths are equal before the law. The constitution states relations between the state and religious organizations shall be regulated by the law “with regard to their influence on the formation of the spiritual, cultural, and state traditions of the Belarusian people.” It prohibits activities by religious groups that are directed against the country’s sovereignty, its constitutional system, and “civic harmony”; involve a violation of civil rights and liberties; “impede the execution of state, public, and family duties” by its citizens; or are detrimental to public health and morality. It also prohibits the creation of political parties or other associations, or political activities that propagate religious hatred. The constitution states the law shall determine conditions for exemption from military service and the performance of alternative service as a substitute. It stipulates the state may grant asylum to persons persecuted in other states for their religious beliefs.

The Office of the Plenipotentiary Representative for Religious and Nationality Affairs (OPRRNA), subordinate to the Council of Ministers, regulates all religious matters. The office takes part in drafting and implementing state policies on religious affairs, enforces and protects religious rights and freedom, monitors activities of religious organizations and compliance with their charters, regulates relations between the state and religious organizations, liaises with state agencies and religious organizations upon their request, promotes tolerance and mutual understanding among religious organizations of various faiths and nationalities, and researches dynamics and trends in interdenominational relations to prevent “religious exclusiveness” and disrespectful treatment of religions and nationalities. The executive committees of the country’s six oblasts (regions) and Minsk city have departments for ideology and youth engagement that include coverage of religious issues. These departments are independent from OPRRNA but share information with it. The President appoints and may dismiss the plenipotentiary representative heading OPRRNA, based on a nomination from the Council of Ministers.

The law recognizes the “determining role” of the BOC, an exarchate (affiliate) of the Russian Orthodox Church, in the development of the traditions of the people, as well as the historical importance of four other religious groups that the government commonly referred to as “traditional” faiths: Roman Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, and evangelical Lutheranism. The law does not consider as traditional faiths newer religious groups or older groups, such as the priestless Old Believers, Greek Catholics, and the Calvinist churches, which have roots in the country dating to the 17th century.

A concordat between authorities and the BOC provides the church with autonomy in its internal affairs, freedom to perform religious rites and other activities, and a special relationship with the state. The concordat recognizes the BOC’s “influence on the formation of spiritual, cultural, and national traditions of the Belarusian people.” Although the concordat states that it does not limit the religious freedom of other religious groups, it calls for authorities and the BOC to combat unnamed “pseudo-religious structures that present a danger to individuals and society.” The BOC, unlike other religious communities, receives state subsidies pursuant to presidential orders. In addition, the BOC possesses the exclusive right to use the word “orthodox” in its title and to use as its symbol the double-barred image of the Cross of Saint Euphrosyne, the country’s Orthodox patron saint.

The concordat serves as the framework for at least a dozen cooperation agreements between the BOC and individual state agencies, including with the Ministries of Defense, Healthcare, and Information. There is also an agreement with the Ministry of Education through 2025 that provides for joint projects for the “spiritual and moral education” of students based on BOC traditions and history. During the year, the BOC signed new five-year cooperation agreements with the Sports and Tourism Ministry and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection.

There are no explicit laws on either hate speech or hate crimes, but the law criminalizes inciting racial, national, religious, or other social hatred or discord based on racial, national, religious, linguistic or other social affiliation, penalties for which range from a fine to five years in prison. Such actions connected with violence or committed by an official using his or her powers are punishable with three to 10 years’ imprisonment and, if committed by a group causing severe consequences or deaths, punishable by five to 12 years in prison.

The law on combating extremism prohibits activities of religious organizations to plan, organize, prepare, and commit encroachment upon independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty, constitutional order, and public security by inciting religious enmity, by organizing mass riots or other actions grossly violating public order based on religious hostility, and by propagating language of exclusivity, superiority, or inferiority of citizens based on their social, racial, national, religious, or linguistic affiliation. The law also bans establishing and running groups aiming to conduct extremist activities, including based on the grounds of racial, national, religious hostility or discord, and to justify Nazism, punishable from three to seven years in prison and up to 10 years if committed by an official.

The criminal code defines as an aggravating factor committing a crime based on racial, national, or religious hostility or discord. It also criminalizes genocide, including based on religious grounds, with punishment ranging from 12 years’ imprisonment to the death penalty, as well as murder and crimes against humanity, including deportation, extrajudicial executions, kidnapping, torture and violence based on the civilian population’s religion. The punishment for the latter ranges from seven years in prison to the death penalty.

The law establishes three tiers of registered religious groups: religious communities, religious associations, and national religious associations. Religious communities must include at least 20 persons older than 18 who live in one or several adjoining areas. Religious associations must include at least 10 religious communities, and one of these communities must have been active in the country for at least 20 years. National-level religious associations may establish regional and local religious associations. National religious associations earn recognition only when they comprise active religious communities in at least four of the country’s six oblasts.

According to OPRRNA data, as of January 1, there were 25 religious faiths and denominations registered in the country, encompassing 3,417 religious communities and 173 religious associations, monasteries, missions, brotherhoods, sisterhoods, and schools. The BOC has 1,733 religious communities, 15 dioceses, six schools, 36 monasteries, one mission, 15 brotherhoods, and nine sisterhoods. The Roman Catholic Church has four dioceses, six schools, 11 missions, nine monasteries, and 500 communities. Protestant religious organizations of 13 denominations encompass 1,040 religious communities, 21 associations, 22 missions, and five schools. There are 34 registered religious communities of Old Believers. There are three Jewish religious associations – Orthodox, Chabad-Lubavitch, and Reform Judaism – comprising 51 communities. There are 24 registered Muslim religious communities – 23 Sunni and one Shia.

The national religious associations are the BOC, Roman Catholic Church, Old Believers Church, Union of Evangelical Christian Baptists, Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith, Confederation of Christian Seventh-day Adventists, Association of New Apostolic Churches, Union of Full Gospel Christian Churches, Association of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Union of Evangelical-Lutheran Churches, Jewish Religious Union, Association of Jewish Religious Communities, Union of Reform Judaism Communities, Muslim Religious Association, Spiritual Board of Muslims, and the Religious Association of Baha’is.

To register, a religious community must submit an official application containing the following information: a list of its founders’ names, places of residence, citizenship, and signatures; copies of its founding statutes; the minutes of its founding meeting; and confirmation from regional authorities of the community’s right to occupy or use any property referenced in its founding statutes. A religious community not previously registered by authorities must also submit information regarding its beliefs. The law stipulates authorities may take up to six months to review a new registration application, which includes an evaluation of the religion by a state-appointed religious commission of experts. The commission evaluates the fundamental teachings of the religious group, as well as its rituals, practices, history, and forms and methods of activities; welfare and charitable services; proselytizing and missionary activities; approaches toward marriage and family; educational activities; attitudes toward health care; and compliance with legal requirements. In addition, the community must submit any texts written by its founder or considered sacred by the followers of the religion, information concerning prohibitions on clergy or adherents, a list of countries where the religion is widely practiced, and a list of countries officially recognizing the religious group. It also must submit information regarding countries that have refused to recognize the religion and information on court cases against its followers in other countries.

Regional authorities, as well as Minsk city authorities or local municipal authorities (for groups outside of Minsk), review all registration applications. Permissible grounds for denial of registration include failure to comply with requirements for establishing a community, an inconsistent or fraudulent charter or other required document, violations of the procedures to establish religious organizations, and a negative evaluation by the state-appointed religious commission of experts. Communities may appeal refusals in court.

To register as a religious association or national religious association, a group must provide an official application with a copy of the founding statutes, a list of members of the managing body with biographical information, proof of permission for the association to be at its designated location, and the minutes from its founding congress. Religious associations have the exclusive right to establish religious educational institutions and to organize cloistered and monastic communities. All applicants must submit forms to establish religious associations and national associations to OPRRNA, which has 30 days to respond. Grounds for refusal are the same as for religious communities, except they also include failure to comply with requirements for establishing an association rather than a community. Applicants may appeal in court refusals or a failure by OPRRNA to respond within the 30-day period.

The law confines the activities of religious communities and associations to the jurisdictional area where they are registered. The law permits state agencies in charge of registration to issue written warnings to a registered religious group for violating any law or undertaking activities outside the scope of responsibilities in the group’s charter. Authorities may apply to a relevant court, depending upon jurisdiction, to shut down the group if it has not ceased the illegal activity outlined in the written warning within six months or if the activity is repeated within one year of the warning. Authorities may suspend activities of the religious group pending the court’s decision. The law does not contain a provision for appealing a warning or suspension.

The law prohibits all religious activity by unregistered groups and criminalizes activities conducted on behalf of unregistered groups, which are punishable by up to two years in prison.

The housing code permits registered religious groups to hold services at residential premises if local authorities grant permission. Local authorities must certify that the premises comply with a number of regulations, including fire safety, sanitary, and health code requirements. Authorities do not grant such permission automatically, and the law prohibits religious groups from holding services in private residences without prior permission from local authorities, who may approve residential worship subject to revocation.

By law, all religious groups must obtain permits to hold events outside of their premises, including when proselytizing.

The law penalizes organizing and participating in unauthorized gatherings, the announcement of an intention to hold a mass event before securing official authorization, training protesters, financing public demonstrations, or soliciting foreign assistance “to the detriment” of the country. Included in the definition of “mass event” are religious events held in places not specifically intended for this purpose, whether outdoors or indoors. The law requires organizers to request permission from authorities to hold a mass event, including those involving religious groups, at least 15 days before the event. Some violations of the law prohibiting unauthorized mass events may be punishable by up to three years in prison. Authorities must inform organizers of a denial no later than five days before the event. In some cases, a first violation of the law within a year’s time involves an administrative penalty of a fine or detention up to 15 days, while if there is a second or further violation during that period the person may be imprisoned up to three years.

Authorities have a system of reimbursements for security, medical, and cleaning services required from organizers of mass events, including religious events held outside of religious premises and sites, rallies, competitions, cultural events, festivals, concerts, and similar occasions. Authorities cover costs associated with events that are officially sponsored at the local and national levels. The law requires organizers to sign contracts for services before applying for a permit to hold a mass event and reimburse all costs within 10 days.

The law requires all religious groups to obtain prior approval from authorities to import and distribute religious literature. The approval process includes official examination of the documents by state-appointed religious studies experts.

Although there is no law providing for a systematic restitution or compensation process for property, including religious property, seized during the Soviet and Nazi periods, claimants may apply for restitution to local authorities. The law on religion specifically bans the restitution of, or compensation for, seized property that is being used for cultural or sports purposes.

The law permits associations and national associations to establish schools to train clergy but does not permit religious communities to do so.

The law permits only registered religious groups that are members of national religious associations to organize extracurricular religious activities at educational institutions. The law states the national religious association must first conclude an agreement on cooperation with the Ministry of Education; the BOC is the only religious group to have such an agreement. Even with such an agreement in place, students who wish to participate in voluntary “moral, civic, and patriotic education” in collaboration with religious groups must either provide a written statement expressing their desire to participate or secure their legal guardians’ approval. According to the law, “Such education shall raise awareness among the youth against any religious groups whose activities are aimed at undermining Belarus’s sovereignty, civic accord, and constitutional system or at violating human rights and freedoms.” Middle school students have the option of voluntary weekly classes on “Spiritual and Moral Culture and Patriotism,” which focus on Russian Orthodox Church history and traditions.

The law prohibits religious groups from conducting activities in any school without identifying themselves, regardless of whether there is an agreement with the Ministry of Education. It also prohibits visits from representatives of foreign religious groups; missionary activities; collections of donations or fees from students for religious groups or any charity; distribution of religious literature, audio, video, and other religious materials; holding prayer services, religious rituals, rites, or ceremonies; and placing religious symbols or related items at educational institutions.

The law does not allow private religious elementary, junior, or senior high schools or homeschooling for religious reasons.

The law establishes penalties ranging from fines to five years in prison for failure to fulfill mandatory military service, with an exemption for conscientious objectors for religious reasons. The law allows alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors. Military service typically lasts from six to 18 months; alternative service may last up to 36 months. By law, individuals who evade alternative civilian service may face up to five years in prison.

Only registered religious associations may apply to OPRRNA for permission to invite foreign clergy to the country. OPRRNA must grant permission before foreign clergy may serve in local congregations, teach or study at local institutions, or participate in charitable work. Authorities generally grant such permission for a period of one year, and they may reduce or extend permissions. OPRRNA has 30 days to respond to requests for foreign clergy permits (religious visas) and may deny requests without explanation. If OPRRNA does not respond, it does not grant permission for a permit. There is no provision for appeals.

By law, authorities permit foreign missionaries to engage in religious activity only in the territorial area where their religious association is registered. Transfers of foreign clergy within a religious association, including from one parish to another, require prior permission from authorities. By law, foreigners may not lead religious groups. Authorities may reprimand or expel foreign citizens who legally are present in the country for nonreligious work if they lead any religious activities. Law enforcement agencies on their own initiative or in response to recommendations from other state agencies, such as the security service, may require foreign clergy to depart the country – a decision that is beyond appeal.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

GOVERNMENT PRACTICES

Abuses Involving Violence, Detention, or Mass Resettlement

Throughout the year, according to local and international civil society and human rights groups, authorities continued to use legislation banning unauthorized mass events and extremist activities to target those who took part in the prodemocracy movement following the 2020 presidential election widely criticized as fraudulent. Those arrested and detained included members of the clergy and churchgoers. Authorities used the same legislation against members of the clergy and religious groups who peacefully protested Russia’s war against Ukraine. Because religious and political activity were often linked, it was difficult to categorize many such incidents as being solely based on religious identity or affiliation.

Authorities continued to harass and detain individuals, including clergy, who expressed disagreement with the Lukashenka regime, criticized violence by agencies under its control, or criticized Russia’s war against Ukraine. According to human rights groups, security officers routinely seized detainees’ mobile phones to guide interrogation based on their messages, social media use, contacts, videos, and photographs, all of which officers often used as a pretext to charge detainees with extremist or other opposition activities characterized as criminal offenses. After sustained harassment and threat of punishment by the regime, many religious leaders and clergy reportedly chose to refrain from commenting publicly or online concerning the regime’s actions or otherwise left the country in self-imposed exile. Authorities stated remarks by religious leaders constituted interference in what they deemed to be political affairs.

According to the independent Belarus-focused monitoring group Christian Vision, a part of the domestic democratic movement, police opened a criminal case in July on charges of inciting religious and social hatred against Uladzislau Beladzed, a religious education teacher at the Roman Catholic Cathedral of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Minsk. Authorities stated that Beladzed had sheltered some protesters from the 2020 prodemocracy demonstrations in the cathedral. The protesters at that time had used the cathedral towers to monitor the movements of security forces and warn other protesters and were later met with force by the security forces. Authorities also accused Beladzed of criticism of police in his online commentary. The Christian Vision report stated that following Beladzed’s arrest on May 31, police beat him, exposed his personal correspondence and photographs, and commented publicly on his sexual identity. The report said police forced him to confess to the allegations against him in a video posted in the police’s Telegram channel. After his arrest, authorities sentenced Beladzed to up to 30 days of detention on additional charges of disseminating extremist materials. He remained in pretrial detention at year’s end. Independent media also reported that on July 14, security forces searched the premises of the Cathedral of the Blessed Virgin Mary in connection to the criminal charges against Beladzed and used violence against at least two local clergy, briefly detaining and interrogating them. While police did not arrest them, the two Catholic priests left the country, fearing further criminal prosecution.

On January 1, police in Minsk detained BOC priest Dzianisi Karastsyaleu for praying for the defenders of Ukraine at a New Year’s service in the Joy of All the Sorrowful Icon of the Mother of God Church. A progovernment blogger and activist reported him to police, and on January 4, BOC Metropolitan Veniamin banned the priest from further religious services due to his actions to “confuse parishioners.”

On February 1, police arrested New Earth Baptist church elder Andrei Mamoika and his spouse Vera on charges of organizing and participating in “action grossly violating public order” after photographs of their participation in the 2020 protests were published online. On April 20, a Minsk district court sentenced both to two and one-half years of house arrest.

On April 20, authorities in Novalukoml arrested local evangelical Christian pastor Alyaksandr Zaretski and sentenced him to 15 days in detention for posting commentary deemed to be related to extremist materials on social media. A local court convicted him on similar charges for reposting what authorities deemed to be extremist content on Radio Liberty and other materials, sentencing Zaretski to an additional 15 days of arrest.

On May 25, authorities in Vitebsk Oblast detained at least three priests: Vyachaslau Adamovich of the Roman Catholic parish of the Holy Virgin Mary in Idolta, Greek Catholic priest Alyaksandr Shautsou in Polatsk, and Andrei Kulik of the Roman Catholic parish of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary parish in Miyory. Shautsou was sentenced to 15 days in jail for reposting extremist materials of the opposition news resource Charter-97 on social media after his computer equipment was confiscated. On June 2, a court in Polatsk convicted Shautsou on similar charges and sentenced him to an additional 30 days in jail. Adamovich received a sentence of seven days in jail for disseminating extremist materials and participating in mass events for subscribing to extremist materials and posting democratic opposition symbols on social media. Kulik was reportedly held in pretrial detention for three days and released without charges in response to similar allegations.

On August 14, officers of the Interior Ministry’s Main Directorate for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption arrested pastor of the New Life Church Vyachaslau Hancharenka and his son-in-law Ilya Budai and searched Hancharenka’s residence. The two were convicted of resisting orders by officials on duty and minor hooliganism and sentenced to 10 and five days in jail, respectively, on August 15.

Several independent media sources reported on November 24 that authorities had opened a criminal case against Roman Catholic priest Henrykh Akalatovich of Saint Joseph Church in Valozhyn on charges of treason. While there was no information regarding allegations against him in the case, sources from his parish said Akalatovich, who remained in pretrial detention at year’s end, required constant medical care and treatment due to cancer and other medical problems.

Abuses Involving the Ability of Individuals to Engage in Religious Activities Alone or In Community with Others

Protestant groups said they remained concerned regarding authorities’ ability to prosecute unregistered religious organizations, although there were no reports authorities did so during the year.

Christian groups continued to state the registration requirements for religious groups remained complex and difficult to fulfill, which they said restricted their activities, suppressed freedom of religion, and legalized administrative penalties such as fines against individuals for their religious beliefs while the groups were unregistered. Authorities’ guidelines for evaluating registration requests remained sufficiently broad and their application arbitrary, they said, to give authorities a pretext for denying requests from disfavored groups. According to human rights observers, some registration attempts during the year were successful while others were not. They noted that some religious communities were delaying applications pending expected amendments to the law in 2024.

Religious groups labeled as “nontraditional” by authorities continued to state the procedure for registering their communities and using residential premises for religious gatherings remained cumbersome and arbitrarily applied.

Some minority religious groups stated they did not apply for registration because their members feared harassment by authorities and did not want to submit their names, as required by the application process.

Sources stated unregistered religious groups continued to maintain a low profile because of fear of prosecution and perceived hostility by the regime. Some registered religious communities said they were reluctant to report restrictions on their activities because they feared drawing additional scrutiny on their members.

On December 30, the Lukashenka regime enacted a law on the freedom of conscience and religious organizations, scheduled to become effective on July 4, 2024, mandates that religious communities and groups reregister with authorities within one year. The law recognizes the special role of the BOC and the Catholic Church in the country’s history and culture along with the Evangelical Lutheran Church, Judaism, and Islam. Under the law, all religious organizations, communities, monasteries, missions, and educational entities will have to apply for new registration and resubmit their charters. Church leaders must be citizens, permanently reside in the country, and may not be designated as extremists or terrorists. The law bans registered religious groups from engaging in political activities or supporting and financing political parties, including the use of religious property for political aims. The new law, once effective, will expand grounds for shutting down religious communities and organizations, including terrorism, extremism, or acting against the sovereignty of the country, its domestic and foreign policy, its constitutional system, and civil harmony.

According to human rights activists, prison administrators selectively delayed or arbitrarily denied clergy visits for certain detainees, especially political prisoners. Many prisons maintained designated Orthodox religious facilities served by BOC clergy, but political prisoners were often prohibited from visiting them. Some prison administrations selectively allowed different Protestant denominations to hold religious meetings for inmates.

On April 3, Minsk city authorities declined a petition from the Roman Catholic Saint Simon and Helena Church (also known as the Red Church) to hold an April 9 Easter service on the grounds of the parish in downtown Minsk. The church remained closed by authorities following a September 2022 fire in an annex building. Deputy Mayor Artsyom Tsuran stated that the premises could not be used until repair works finished and that the Church’s request did not comply with regulations on holding mass events.

Authorities continued attempts to censor the pan-Christian hymn “Mahutny Bozha” (Almighty God) and harass and punish religious leaders, clergy, event organizers, and laypeople who sang or allowed or supported the singing of the hymn. The hymn became linked to the country’s post-Soviet national revival in the early 1990s, when it was proposed (unsuccessfully) as the national anthem, and it had been sung routinely by both religious communities and prodemocracy opposition individuals since then. After the 2020 presidential election, civil society and the prodemocracy movement adopted it as an unofficial anthem and prayer, including during protests.

According to observers, authorities continued surveillance of registered and unregistered religious groups, including monitoring the social media accounts of clergy members. The sources stated “ideology officers” and other representatives of the Lukashenka regime continued to monitor the activities of members of unregistered and registered religious groups, including in their workplaces, although there were no reports of prosecutions based on this type of surveillance.

Authorities, including security forces, reportedly continued to hold occasional “informal talks” with leaders and members of religious groups to learn about their activities. According to religious leaders, state security officers also continued to attend religious services of registered nontraditional Protestant communities to conduct surveillance, which group members described as intimidation and harassment. According to these religious leaders, security officials monitored religious groups for activities or speech perceived as indicating support for the opposition or dissatisfaction with authorities.

Religious groups, especially Protestants and Jehovah’s Witnesses, continued to report they remained cautious about proselytizing and distributing religious materials due to their perceptions that they could face intimidation or punishment, as proselytization without prior authorization was considered an unsanctioned mass event, and hence illegal.

According to media accounts, the BOC was free to proselytize without restrictions on television and in print media as well as in public spaces.

On April 28, the New Life Church stated in a social media post that a Minsk district court had fined seven young evangelical Christians, including five members of the church, up to 3,700 rubles ($1,100) each for proselytizing on April 15 – the day before Easter – in central Minsk. Police detained the group, transported them to a local precinct, questioned them, charged them with violating mass events regulations, and released them pending trial, which had not commenced at year’s end.

According to the international religious freedom nongovernmental organization Forum 18, on June 1, police in the town of Drahichyn arrested local unregistered Baptist pastor Uladzimir Burshtyn and charged him with violating mass events regulations. At his closed trial the next day, the court fined him 555 rubles ($170). Charges against Burshtyn concerned actions by him, his fellow parishioners, and musicians demonstrating their faith in Drahichyn streets on May 27, which involved singing and distributing religious literature. Police halted the event and questioned all participants. On July 27, a prosecutor summoned Burshtyn and warned him against proselytizing, threatening him with criminal prosecution for violating the laws on inciting religious and social hatred.

According to anecdotal evidence and independent media reports, clergy from religious groups labeled by authorities both as traditional and nontraditional opted for self-censorship and avoided discussing political repression or Russia’s war against Ukraine in their sermons and during services.

On February 28, the Polish Foreign Ministry issued a statement condemning the country’s government for forcing the Roman Catholic Blessed Virgin Mary of the Rosary Church in the village of Soly to remove a mural titled “Miracle on the Vistula.” The ministry said the removal constituted “the destruction of Polish cultural heritage, an integral part of Belarusian history, in an undignified and unacceptable way.” In December 2022, local authorities and national officials noted the mural featured the 1920 Battle of Warsaw during the Soviet-Polish war, in which Soviet forces were defeated, and said it incited ethnic and religious hatred, claiming that Poland sought to reclaim former Polish territory in western Belarus.

On October 11, independent media reported clergy of the BOC Holy Intercession Cathedral in Hrodna removed at least two icons depicting martyrs who died at the hands of Bolshevik forces in the early 20th century. According to a local progovernment Telegram channel, the icons were removed for promoting “unacceptable scenes of violence and hostility in such a godly place.” The channel also stated “the faces of saints should inspire positive emotional experiences and promote correct ethical and moral education.” The icons depicted priests who had been killed for their faith as well as their killers, including Red Army soldiers and Soviet police in uniform.

According to Christian Vision, on December 20, Plenipotentiary Representative for Religious and Nationality Affairs Alyaksandr Rumak and head of the Ideology Department of the Minsk city executive committee Volha Chamadanava convened a meeting with the BOC Diocese of Minsk clergy to warn them against engaging in political activity, demonstrating any opposition or extremist symbols in churches, and praying for the victory of Ukraine, threatening them with criminal prosecution. Chamadanava also instructed the clergy to update their parishes’ websites to demonstrate more support of the government and its activities.

In general, communities did not report impediments to purchases or rentals of nonsanctioned places of worship. Some religious communities with outstanding property cases, such as the Roman Catholic Red Church in Minsk, continued to engage with authorities and the legal system to resolve them. After a fire in one of its annexes in September 2022, authorities banned the Red Church from using its church building, long subject to property disputes between the regime and the Catholic Church since Soviet times. Authorities attributed the September fire to electrical problems, which the church disputed; the church also contested the decision of authorities to keep the church closed after the fire, stating the level of damage did not warrant closure. On October 26, the deputy chair of the Minsk city executive committee said at a press conference that repair and restoration work would start at the church in the first quarter of 2024, after which the government would decide on reopening the building.

Converting residential property for religious use remained difficult. Protestant groups stated they continued to face more severe consequences than other groups because they were less likely to own religious facilities, and that they could not apply for permission to conduct religious activities in private homes because residences were too small to accommodate their numbers or communities remained unregistered due to the small number of their members.

On June 20, Minsk city authorities bulldozed the New Life Church building, which the church had purchased and used for services until its eviction in 2021 in the wake of a long dispute with the regime regarding payment of taxes. At the beginning of the year, the church stopped holding services in the parking lot of the building, which it had done in protest of the eviction, after authorities continuously warned senior pastor Vyachaslau Hancharenka that parishioners would face arrest, stating the services were illegal and neighborhood residents had complained of the unsanctioned gatherings. While the church’s leadership continued to hold online services, including on its YouTube channel, the Minsk and Maladzechna District Courts declared in August that materials on the church’s social media channels, including its webpage and its Instagram, YouTube, and Facebook accounts, were extremist, citing materials the courts stated contained deliberately false information on the political and social situation in the country and that incited social and religious hatred. Several New Life Church videos and publications included condemnations of the 2020 postelection police use of violence against protesters and democratic activists and subsequent actions against the regime’s opponents. On October 17, a Minsk district court issued a formal ruling to shut down the church, depriving it of formal registration. On December 12, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the district court, and there was no further avenue for appeal.

According to media reports, school administrators continued to cooperate with the BOC but not with other religious groups, based on the BOC’s concordat with the regime. School administrators continued to invite BOC priests to lecture to students, organize tours of church facilities, and participate in BOC festivities, programs, and humanitarian projects.

The government continued to allocate funds to cover salaries of professors and employees, as well as stipends for students at BOC seminaries. As in previous years, Protestant groups and the Roman Catholic Church said their schools did not receive any financial support from authorities.

In compliance with the BOC cooperation agreement with the Education Ministry and various educational institutions, a coordination council, composed of Education Minister Andrei Ivanets, BOC Metropolitan Veniamin, and other senior officials, met on August 15 to discuss development and implementation of cooperation programs. The meeting reportedly focused on expanding extracurricular educational opportunities and uniting them with spiritual efforts in educating children and youth and shaping their moral principles with the BOC’s direct engagement.

Abuses Involving Discrimination or Unequal Treatment

Unlike other religious groups, the BOC continued to participate in many state-sponsored public events, such as rallies or celebrations, without the need to seek prior approval from authorities. Regional authorities and state-run companies often included BOC representatives in their events.

Authorities continued to permit the BOC to collect charitable donations in public venues as well as on its religious property. While the law does not restrict other religious groups from soliciting donations in public, representatives of these groups said authorities continued to limit their fundraising activities to their own places of worship or other properties. The groups said they faced harassment and possible detention if they tried to seek donations at other locations.

Some BOC leaders amplified Russia’s propaganda on the war on Ukraine. In a January 24 interview to his eparchy’s website, BOC Archbishop of Navahrudak Huriy said he supported the resurrection of “the triune Russia” and charged the West and Ukraine with attacking Orthodoxy and “everything Russian.” He condemned Ukraine for “destroying a true canonical church” and promoting neopaganism of an “openly demonic nature.”

In his sermons and public appearances during the year, BOC Archpriest and rector of the Saint Elizabeth Monastery in Minsk Andrei Lemiashonak expressed gratitude to the government for its facilitating Russia’s war against Ukraine and continued to encourage his monastery’s charitable activities, support, and donations towards Russian troops in Donbas.

Religious groups said the regime continued to apply visa regulations inconsistently, which affected the ability of foreign missionaries to live and work in the country, and the visa application process remained burdensome. Officials required all foreign clergy working in the country to obtain religious permits to serve at religious institutions and conduct religious duties.

Roman Catholic clergy continued to state that foreign priests faced multiple challenges, including a lengthy approval process before obtaining permission to celebrate Mass, and that officials often issued visas for only three- to six-month authorizations.

Other Developments Affecting Religious Freedom

During the year, the Jewish community and foreign donors worked with local authorities to erect more than one dozen privately funded monuments and plaques and to restore memorials commemorating victims of the Holocaust at sites of mass killings in Vitsebsk, Mikhalishki, Ezerysche, Ruzhany, Slonim, and other locations in the country.

In August and September, courts in Miyory, Vitsebsk, and Lida declared Christian Vision’s social media and messenger groups to be extremist for their independent monitoring of religious freedom abuses in the country, subjecting subscribers and those engaging in such actions as likes, reposts, and shares of Christian Vision material to fines and up to 15 days’ detention.

On November 17, the Defense Ministry reported that as of November 1, it established a new position of religious instructor in the armed forces. According to the ministry, clergy with relevant spiritual education who were ordained and fit for conscription would be appointed as instructors, tasked with leading spiritual and moral education and meeting the spiritual and religious needs of military personnel. The ministry also reported that as of November 17, six clergymen served as instructors.

Section III.

Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom

Antisemitic comments appeared on social media, online chat channels, and in the comment sections of local online news articles, although it was unclear whether all comments were posted by persons in the country. For example, several state-owned television channels covered a commercial evacuation flight from Israel to Belarus on November 6, which carried more than 115 Belarusian citizens. Hundreds of commentators urged the regime against welcoming the evacuees and argued to send them to Gaza, saying, for example, “they should be held liable for their crimes,” “they betrayed their country [of Belarus] by leaving it and can no longer be loyal and patriotic residents,” and generally questioning their integrity.

Other social media commentary was related to the war in Ukraine, including derogatory references to the Jewish identity of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. For example, on September 18, a progovernment Telegram channel mocked a photograph featuring a greeting between an Ultra-Orthodox Jewish pilgrim and a Ukrainian national guard member during a celebration of the Rosh Hashanah holiday in the Ukrainian city of Uman, calling the latter “a neo-Nazi and an ideological enemy [of Jews]” and describing the Holocaust as “nonsense.”

On January 20, the Roman Catholic Church reported that vandals broke windows of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary and Saint Stanislau Church in Mahilyou. On January 26, police stated they had opened a criminal investigation and identified two perpetrators, whom a court subsequently found guilty of hooliganism.

The BOC continued its annual commemoration in honor of Hauryil Belastoksky (Gabriel of Bialystok), a child allegedly killed by Jews in Bialystok in 1690. The ROC considers him a saint and martyr, and the BOC falls under the ROC’s authority on traditional practices such as this. The memorial prayer recited on each anniversary of Belastoksky’s death on May 3 states the “martyred and courageous Hauryil exposed Jewish dishonesty,” although a trial after the boy’s death acquitted the person charged with the crime.

An interreligious working group comprising the BOC, Roman Catholic Church, Union of Evangelical Christian Baptists, Union of Evangelical-Lutheran Churches, and Jewish communities organized seminars and educational events during the year. For example, the group held multiple seminars on issues related to the religion and society, in particular religious practice and personal experiences, including modern cultural development in the country in the digital age.

Section IV.

U.S. Government Policy and Engagement

Despite suspended operations of the U.S. Embassy in Minsk since February 2022, the Charge d’Affaires, based in Vilnius, Lithuania, and other embassy personnel continued to engage on religious issues. This included meetings with religious leaders on issues related to religious freedom and antisemitism, including the registration of religious communities, the state of religious instruction and education for minority communities, the freedom to express and practice religious beliefs, and state pressure on members of the clergy for exercising their religious beliefs and participating in or commenting on political life in their personal capacities.

Embassy representatives also continued to meet throughout the year with representatives of the BOC and the Roman Catholic Church, as well as Protestant, Jewish, and other minority religious groups. Embassy representatives also met with civil society representatives to learn about religious activities and discuss the regime’s actions that repressed religious freedom.

The embassy continued to hold regular discussions about restrictions on religious freedom with religious freedom activists and religious leaders. Embassy representatives also discussed the status of the Roman Catholic community and the state’s relationship with the church with diplomatic colleagues at the Apostolic Nunciature. The embassy maintained close coordination with likeminded foreign missions in Minsk and Vilnius on issues of religious freedom in the country.

The regime’s political restrictions on public gatherings and the embassy’s suspended operations limited the embassy’s ability to hold events and public engagements with representatives from religious communities. Embassy representatives discussed antisemitism and the preservation of Jewish cultural heritage with Jewish groups.

In January, the Chargé participated in an event commemorating International Holocaust Remembrance Day and Holocaust victims at the Reform Judaism community center and synagogue in Minsk. The embassy shared photographs on social media from the event to commemorate the thousands of Jewish victims, to show support for the country’s Jewish community, and to emphasize the importance of historical accuracy.

Source

Address:
Complesso di Vicolo Valdina
sala della Sacrestia
Via di Campo Marzio 42, Roma

Opening hours of the exhibition:
The exhibition will be open from 18-20 June from 11:00-19:00 and 21 June from 11:00-17:00.
During the opening, a performance will be presented entitled “Belarusian political prisoners”. The performance was prepared by member of the Christian Vision PhD Natallia Harkovich.

Among the organisators: Christian Vision for Belarus
Association of Belarusians in Italy “Talaka” in collaboration with the People’s Embassy of Belarus in Italy and non-profit organization “Iscos Toscana”

Xisha Angelova has painted about 700 portraits of Belarusian political prisoners since November 2020 (our interview with the artist). The collection is being fulfilled on a daily basis, but Belarusian prisons are filling up more quickly than anticipated. Christian Vision started online catalogue of the potraits.

The project has visited the European Parliament in Strasbourg, the Austrian Parliament in Vienna, Vilnius, Warsaw, Munich, Brno, Olsztyn and other locations across Europe. It provides a personalised insight into the significant numbers of Belarusian people imprisoned and killed by the Lukashenko regime.

Since 2020, more than 5,000 individuals in Belarus have been subjected to unjust imprisonment, with over 1,548 currently imprisoned or facing restrictions on their liberty.

Christian Vision for Belarus has the Solidarity Fund will conduct ongoing collection and targeted fundraising campaigns, and facilitate the following types of assistance to Christians who have been persecuted or are at risk of persecution, see details.

10 February 2024

In the following input for 2024 report of the Special Rapporteur on Belarus to the Human Rights Council, which is focused on freedom of association, Christian Vision is going to focus on restriction of the collective, communal, corporate dimension of freedom of religion or belief, which is strongly undermined by the new legislation and by restrictive and repressive measures towards religious communities and religious leaders in Belarus.

Christian Vision for Belarus is a non-governmental organisation uniting clergy, theologians and activists of the Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic and Evangelical churches in Belarus and abroad. It was established in September 2020 to coordinate informational, analytical, human rights, social, cultural, diplomatic, scholarly and pastoral work in the context of the deepening political crisis in Belarus, and — from February 2022 — Russian aggression against Ukraine. The Christian Vision’s aims are: the preservation of dignity and human rights in Belarus; democratic development of the country; national revival; interfaith dialogue and cooperation; stopping repressions against civil society; observing the principles of the rule of law; justice and non-discrimination; establishing a just and stable peace in the region; encouraging national dialogue and international reconciliation. One of our main areas of activities is monitoring of the situation on freedom of religion or belief in general, as well as of cases of violation of this right, persecutions and discrimination against Belarusian Christian activists and communities, advocacy and support to victims of human rights violations.¹

Freedom of association and freedom of religion or belief are two rights which are closely intertwined, while the freedom of association is a prerequisite for the exercise of freedom of religion, and restrictions upon freedom of association result in violation of freedom of religion. Article 18 of the ICCPR protects the participation in the life of the community as the manifestation of the religion or belief of an individual member. Religious organisations are a special kind of association and serve as a conduit for exercising the right to freedom of religion or belief – in community with others. 

On the one hand, international standards of human rights defend freedom of religion, and therefore, the rights of religious association even more strongly that the freedom of association in general. While according to art. 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, “national security” may be a legitimate ground for restriction on the freedom of association, Art. 18 of the same treaty excludes this purpose. 

Concerning this the UN Human Rights Committee states in its CCPR General Comment No. 22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience or Religion), “that paragraph 3 of article 18 is to be strictly interpreted: restrictions are not allowed on grounds not specified there, even if they would be allowed as restrictions to other rights protected in the Covenant, such as national security” (par. 8). Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights demand, that freedom of thought, conscience and religion shall be protected as a non-derogable right even in time of emergency threatening the life of the nation (par. 58). 

On the other hand, freedom of religious association, including freedom of religious or belief communities, which do not seek to be recognised as legal persons, as well as of religious and belief organisations which seek such recognition, is protected under both Articles 18 and 22 of the ICCPR. As the European Court of Human Rights stated in its Decision in the case of Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria (2000), if the organisation of the religious community is concerned the freedom of religion or belief must be interpreted in the light of freedom of association, “which safeguards associative life against unjustified State interference”, and “were the organisational life of the community not protected” by the freedom of religion of belief, “all other aspects of the individual’s freedom of religion would become vulnerable” (par. 62).

In Belarus a new Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations was adopted by a Law on Amending Laws on the Issues of Activities of Religious Organisations signed by Aliaksandr Lukashenka on 30 December 2023 and published on 5 January 2024. According to this Law on Amending, the new Law on Freedom of Conscience comes into force six months after its official publication, that means, from 5 July 2024 (Art. 7). After that all religious organisations, registered before 5 July 2024, are required to undergo a process of re-registration until 5 July 2025. (Art. 4) This law in comparison with its previous version, restricts freedom of religion even in a more severe way. This was also noticed in your report as the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, together with the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief on 28 August 2023 (OL BLR 7/2023).

Firstly, the Law demands mandatory state registration of a religious organisation as a pre-condition to operate and exercise their freedom of religion or belief (Art. 15). All activities and even the very existence outside this framework are banned (Art. 15) and criminalised (Article 193.1 of the criminal code). As stated in the Report of the then Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, a provision of Article 18, par. 1 of the ICCPR clearly includes a collective, community dimension of the freedom of religion or belief, and therefore “registration should not be compulsory, i.e. it should not be a precondition for practising one’s religion, but only for the acquisition of a legal personality status” (UN Doc.A/HRC/19/60, par. 41). 

The freedom to manifest religion or belief in community belongs to individuals and therefore cannot be limited by a requirement of mandatory state registration. However, in the new law, as well as in its previous versions, communities which choose not to register, or do not meet requirements of registration, are outlawed and are at risk of criminal prosecution, which severely limits and violates both the right of the community itself and the right of its individual members to manifest their religion or belief. 

Secondly, for the state registration of the religious communities, which is the only way for them to acquire legal personality, and therefore the only way to act in a legal framework, excessive demands are posed in comparison with other non-commercial organisations, which is discriminatory against religious organisations. 

For non-commercial organisations of other kinds these demands are much lower. For example, to establish a “local public association” there is a minimum of ten members who are citizens of Belarus, without a requirement to live in the same locality (Art. 8 of the Law on Public Associations), while for a religious community the law demands at least twenty members who live in the same or neighbouring locality (Art. 13 of the Law on Freedom of Conscience). In the localities where fewer than twenty people of the same religious tradition are living, there is no legal possibility to register a religious community, and therefore in case of manifesting together their freedom of religion or belief are at risk of criminal prosecution.

While for a non-commercial association to create a union the law demands only two public associations without restriction on their locality (Art. 8 of the Law on Public Associations), for a religious union (association) of communities the respective law requires at least ten religious communities; for the republican union there is also a requirement that at least one of the community should have operated for a least thirty years since its state registration.

Thirdly, the law restricts individuals who are foreign citizens (Art. 13) as well as individuals who are included in the lists of organisations, formations, individual entrepreneurs and citizens involved in extremist activities (Art. 12) to be founding members and head of the religious organisations. 

Differentiation between domestic and foreign nationals “as regards their ability to exercise the right to freedom of religion through participation in the life of organised religious communities” according to the ECHR’s Decision in the case Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia (Application no. 72881/01, par. 82) has no reasonable and objective justification. Depriving foreign citizens of the right to head religious organisations, undermines not only the right of them as individuals, but also the right of the religious or belief community to freely decide itself on its leadership.

Political prisoners, who are condemned under a range of criminal articles, including art. 342 of the criminal code (“Preparation of actions which gravely violate public order”), art. 368 of the criminal code (“Insulting the President of the Republic of Belarus”) are often at risk of being included in the mention list. Both Articles 342 and 368 were contested by the Venice Commission in its Opinion No. 1016/2020 on the compatibility with European standards of certain criminal law provisions used to prosecute peaceful demonstrators and members of the “Coordination Council”.

Christian Vision has identified at least 57 believers in the current list, ² including one Orthodox priest (Rev. Siarhei Rezanovich), one Baptist pastor (Vitali Chychmarou), one minister of the Orthodox Church (Yauheni Hlushkou), four ministers of Protestant churches – Lidziya Ivanova (“New Testament” Evangelical church), Andrei and Vera Mamoika (“New Land” Baptist church), Maksim Stasilevich (“Gethsemane” Evangelical church). All of the mentioned persons are deprived from the right to be founding members or head of a religious organisation.

Fourthly, the area where religious communities are allowed to operate is restricted to one or several neighbouring localities, where its members are registered as residents (Art. 13). Therefore, even if a community enjoys legal status in one locality, it is outlawed when operating in another locality.

Fifthly, legal grounds to withdraw state registration and to dissolve a religious organisation were expanded in the new law, and go beyond the strict criteria of par. 3 of Article 18 of the ICCPR. Even if there are legal grounds in compliance with the demands of the article, a withdrawal of legal personality status shall be applied only as the last resort, after the violations become grave and systematic and other measures previously used, taking into consideration that the consequences of such withdrawal would have on the legal status of a religious community. As you rightly point in your report as the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, together with the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief on 28 August 2023 (OL BLR 7/2023) with reference to the Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief (A/73/362, par. 17), “depriving a religious or belief community of legal status can have a tremendous impact on the collective aspects of the right to freedom of religion or belief, including the ability of adherents to practice their faith together with others — jeopardizing the viability of the community itself”. 

The legal grounds for dissolving a religious organisation (Art. 23) include, for example, political loyalty to the state authorities: activities which are going in contradiction with “the main directions of domestic and foreign policy”, (p.2, par.10 Art. 8), “discrediting of the Republic of Belarus” (p.3, par. 10 Art. 8), “other extremist activities” (p. 3, par. Art. 8) are forbidden. 

“Discrediting of the Republic of Belarus” is a term referring to a criminal offence, prosecuted under Article 369-1 of the Criminal Code and “extremist activities” are covered by the Law on Combating Extremism, which after amendment on 14 May 2021 expanded the notion of “extremism”. Both are very controversial terms because of their broad definition which include restrictions of freedom of conscience, of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, and can be used “to curtail the right to participate in political and public life” and “to punish dissenting views”, as stated in Prof. Hervé Ascenio’s Report on the serious threat to the OSCE human dimension in Belarus since 5 November 2020 (par. 42). They are used for politically motivated repressions also against believers and religious communities.

There are several examples when political disloyalty and expressing dissenting views were the ground for dissolving or threatening to dissolve a religious organisation which were used by the authorities to arbitrarily target religious leaders and communities.

12 December 2023 the Supreme Court took a final decision on liquidation of the Full Gospel church “New Life” following recognition of some of the materials published on its media and social media as “extremist”, namely, a video entitled “Position of Christians of the New Life Church” against the political persecution, terror and violence published in 2020,³ and a post on the church’s Instagram profile dated 17 August 2020, which contained photos of church members who stood in front of the church in a prayer chain on 16 August 2020, accompanied by a message advocating for Christians standing against violence. On 23, 25, 28 and 31 August 2023 different courts classified the church’s Instagram, the specified video on its YouTube, official website, Facebook, Telegram, VKontakte page, alongside a YouTube video titled “Pastor Viachaslau Hancharenka condemns violence and calls on the authorities to repent!” as “extremist materials”.⁴

Another instance is a warning no. 02-02/812 issued on 27 November 2020 by the Plenipotentiary for Religious and Ethnic Affairs to the Belarusian Orthodox Church.⁵ In the warning it was pointed out that the Church had allegedly violated article 16 of the Constitution and Article 8 of the Law On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations of the Republic of Belarus, and in accordance with Article 37 of the mentioned law, repeated violations within a year may lead to the body which registered the religious organisation to apply to the court for the liquidation of that organisation and, consequently, banning its activities in the Republic of Belarus. On 17 December 2020 this warning with instruction to fulfil the requirements was redirected by the Primate of the Belarusian Orthodox Church Metropolitan Veniamin (Tupeka) of Minsk to the late Archbishop of Hrodna Artemy (Kishchanka), who publicly spoke out several times against election fraud and violence: in a statement on 14 August 2020; in a sermon on 16 August 2020; in a sermon on Forgiveness Sunday on 14 March 2021.⁶

Following the 2020 events, the Belarusian regime started to purge the media space, identifying independent media, websites, Telegram channels, social networks, as well as symbols associated with peaceful protest, as “extremist materials.” This led to administrative prosecution under Article 19.11 of the Code of Administrative Offences, including individuals who share information from such information sources, or information that contains logos of these information sources. Websites, channels and social media accounts linked to Belarusian religious figures and communities are systematically recognised as extremist materials. Currently, the list of extremist materials includes media linked to a Roman Catholic priest Viachaslau Barok, Orthodox Archbishop of Hrodna and Vaŭkavysk Artemy (Kishchanka), a Belarusian Greek Catholic newspaper Tsarkva, Full Gospel Church New Life, Ecumenical group Christian Vision, Catholic Telegram-channel Rerum Novarum, Catholic journalist and activist Maksim Hacak, Belarusian Orthodox parish in Vilnius (Ecumenical Patriarchate), Orthodox theologian Natallia Vasilevich, anti-war ecumenical channel Christians against war!⁷

Sixthly, Art. 4 of the Law on the Amending Laws on the Issues of Activities of Religious Organisations requires re-registration for all religious organisations which are already registered prior to the new Law on Freedom of Conscience entering into force. If the registered religious organisation fails to reregister, it loses its legal status even if it previously enjoyed it. Re-registration requires the same procedure as the registration of a new organisation. That means, that the new law in fact withdraws the status of a legal entity and demands to register anew.

Seventhly, religious organisations are limited in their activities and participation in public life, there is a restriction under par. 7 Article 8, which states “religious organisations are prohibited to participate in political activities”, although par. 6 Art. 8 gives to the religious organisation the right “to participate in life of society, in solving current social problems of society.” First of all, the ban of the religious organisation to participate in political activities is not legitimate. Secondly, there is no differentiation given between the participation in the “life of society” and in “political activities”, which opens the possibility to arbitrarily consider public activities of a religious organisation as political and punish them.

Eighthly, since the beginning of the current political crisis in 2020, the authorities intimidate, detain, and threaten religious leaders and their respective communities, the communities are the subject of hate-speech and defamation by state propaganda.⁸ Since September 2020 Christian Vision identified 19 Orthodox, 25 Roman Catholic, 5 Greek Catholic, 25 Protestant priests, pastors and ministers who experienced searches, detentions, trials, arrests, criminal persecution, fines, tortures and threats.⁹ From the most recent cases, Volha Chamadanova, the head of the main department of ideological work and youth affairs of Minsk City Executive Committee, and in 2020, press secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, speaking to the assembly of clergy of Minsk diocese on 20 December 2023 in Minsk openly threatened “ideologically alien clergy” with detention and imprisonment. According to her, over the course of a year, the authorities monitored more than 500 religious communities, in the process preventing the spread of “extremist” literature, and also revealed that in churches they prayed for Ukraine’s victory in the war.

Conclusion. The new Law on Freedom of Conscience, aimed at regulating religious activities in the Republic of Belarus, is repressive and discriminatory in nature, and does not comply with the international obligations undertaken by the Republic of Belarus to guarantee the right to freedom of religion, in particular Art. 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It also severely restricts freedom of association, protected under Art. 22 of ICCPR.

The provisions of the Law are aimed at strict control, including control of the political and ideological loyalty of religious organisations that are allowed to operate in the Republic of Belarus. Other organisations, as well as persons engaged in religious activities without registration, will be at risk of prosecution, including criminal prosecution. The vagueness of such concepts as “extremist activity” and “ideology of the Belarusian state” makes it possible to arbitrarily deny registration to religious organisations, as well as to liquidate them.

The tightening of repressive measures against religious activity is a consequence of the general policy of the Belarusian regime to control civil society, ensure its loyalty and eliminate any protest or independent activity.

11 January 2024
Felix Corley, Forum 18, and Olga Glace, Forum 18

Belarus’ repressive new Religion Law – now signed and which comes into force on 5 July 2024 – continues to require all religious communities to gain state registration before they are allowed to exist and continues to ban the activity of unregistered religious organisations. “There’s nothing new under the sun,” one Baptist commented. All registered religious communities are required to seek re-registration between 5 July 2024 and 5 July 2025. Officials refused to put Forum 18 through to senior regime religious affairs official Aleksandr Rumak, whose office drafted the new Law.

Aleksandr Lukashenko signed into law Belarus’ repressive new Law covering religion on 30 December 2023, exactly one year after he first announced it. The final text was officially published on 5 January 2024. The largest part of the new Law is a new version of the Religion Law, which comes into force on 5 July 2024. It requires all registered religious communities to seek re-registration between 5 July 2024 and 5 July 2025.

Any religious communities that fail to gain re-registration will be deemed illegal and any activity they undertake will – like any exercise of freedom of religion or belief without state permission – risk criminal or administrative punishment (see below).

One Council of Churches Baptist – whose congregations choose not to seek state permission to exercise freedom of religion or belief – pointed to the new Law’s continuing ban on unregistered activity. “As the Bible says [Ecclesiastes 1:9], there’s nothing new under the sun,” the Baptist told Forum 18. Compulsory registration “began in the Soviet Union and nothing has changed”. The Baptist insists that their congregations “will stick to our firm position” not to seek state registration (see below).

“I have not seen the final text but judging by the draft it will bring nothing good,” a Muslim told Forum 18 from Minsk. The Muslim feared that their national religious organisation, the Religious Board of Muslims in Belarus, might be forced to end its existence. “The main problem is the number of believers below which many small communities will fail re-registration” (see below).

Leonid Mikhovich, the head of the Baptist Union, welcomed several changes in the final version compared to the earlier draft, including the removal of a requirement for religious organisations to report to local executive committees on their religious education of children. But he expressed concern that no possibility exists for small religious communities without 20 adult founders. He also expressed concern about the extensive information founders need to provide to the authorities. “It is still necessary during registration to submit information about their place of work,” he told Forum 18 (see below).

After the new Law was signed and officially published, members of various other religious communities declined to discuss their view of it with Forum 18 (see below).

Among numerous restrictions (see below), the draft Religion Law:
– continues to require all religious communities to gain state registration before they are allowed to exist;
– continues to ban the activity of unregistered religious organisations;
– imposes compulsory re-registration within one year on all registered religious organisations, paralleling earlier demands on political parties and other public associations;
– imposes even tighter registration restrictions and conditions;
– makes extensive and arbitrary use of the undefined terms “extremism”, “terrorism”, and “the ideology of the Belarusian state” to justify restricting the exercise of freedom of religion or belief and related fundamental freedoms;
– continues powers for the regime to inspect and monitor religious communities;
– gives greater “legal” possibilities for the regime to forcibly close religious communities;
– continues and increases censorship and restrictions on religious literature and items;
– imposes new restrictions on religious education by religious communities, including requiring teaching to be in Belarusian or Russian;
– aims to separate religious communities from involvement with wider society;
– and imposes new restrictions on religious charitable activity, allowing no religious organisations except monasteries from running children’s homes (see below).

The new Law – which replaces the restrictive 2002 Religion Law – was prepared by the regime’s chief religious affairs official, Plenipotentiary for Religious and Ethnic Affairs Aleksandr Rumak. The regime allowed only 10 days for public consultation in June 2023 after making public the then draft text. It handed the proposed Law to the non-freely elected parliament in September 2023. Both chambers of parliament approved it by 13 December 2023 (see below).

Officials have repeatedly refused to discuss with Forum 18 why the new Law might be needed or to discuss its content. While the new Law was in the lower chamber of the non-freely elected parliament, the assistant to deputy Lyudmila Zdorikova of the Human Rights, Ethnic Relations and the Media Commission, who was overseeing its adoption, refused to put Forum 18 through to her or to discuss the draft (see below).

Both while the Law was in parliament and once it was adopted, no-one from the Plenipotentiary’s office was prepared to discuss it with Forum 18. “Aleksandr Rumak does not give interviews by phone,” an official told Forum 18 on 4 January 2024 (see below).

“We look at the new law with caution,” a Protestant pastor who asked not to be identified for fear of state reprisals told Forum 18 while the new Law was in preparation. “It promises nothing good, but it depends on how formally it will be applied as the wording in some parts is obscure.” The pastor noted the “endlessly expanding” list of reasons the state could use to liquidate religious communities. “If desired, they may be applied to any religious organisation” (see below).

The Head of the Baptist Union, Leonid Mikhovich, said their “main concern” was the requirement to have 20 founders for registering a religious community. “In some villages we do not have the required number of people, while the law provides no other option other than to have 20 people to be allowed to hold regular worship meetings,” he told Forum 18 while the new Law was in preparation (see below).

“Many of our communities will fail the state re-registration, mostly those in the countryside where there are not many people,” a member of the Religious Board of Muslims in Belarus, who asked not to be identified for fear of state reprisals, told Forum 18 while the new Law was in preparation. “There is also a risk that our religious association, the Muftiate, will not have enough member communities for registration” (see below).

A member of the Minsk community of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (commonly known as the Mormons), who asked not to be identified for fear of state reprisals, also expressed concern about re-registration. “Some of our believers might feel uneasy to disclose their personal information, which is demanded at re-registration,” the individual told Forum 18 while the new Law was in preparation. “Many communities rent buildings for worship, while others cannot find any and have to meet online” (see below).

Independent news website Zerkalo (working in exile as the regime has banned it as “extremist”) noted the new restrictions and requirement for all registered religious organisations to undergo re-registration. “Earlier this year, all opposition parties were liquidated in this manner,” Zerkalo noted while the new Law was in preparation. “Apparently, having ‘cleaned up’ most spheres of public life, the authorities finally got round to religion and decided not to limit themselves to targeted measures like arresting ‘wrong’ priests, so now there will also be fewer churches” (see below).

On 28 August 2023, three United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteurs – Anaïs Marin (Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus), Clément Nyaletsossi Voule (Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association), and Nazila Ghanea (Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief) – wrote to the regime expressing concerns that provisions in the proposed new Law “would fail to meet Belarus’ obligations under international human rights law” (see below).

The three Special Rapporteurs expressed specific concerns about: mandatory state registration; compulsory re-registration; tighter registration restrictions and conditions; increased monitoring and surveillance of religious organisations; restrictions on religious literature and items; monitoring and inspection of religious organisations; expansion of legal grounds allowing state authorities to dissolve religious organisations; and new restrictions on religious charitable activity (see below).

The three Special Rapporteurs also noted: “In 2020, Belarus also supported a recommendation during the Universal Periodic Review to ensure that no restrictions are imposed on the right to freedom of religion and belief.” The Rapporteurs urged the regime to “review and reconsider certain key aspects of the law to ensure that it complies with Belarus’ international human rights law obligations.” They urged the regime not to “rush the process” of adopting the draft Law. The UN website records no response to the communication from the regime (see below).

Short timescale, civil society punished for attempts to improve 2002 Law

The regime announced in a 30 December 2022 Decree by Aleksandr Lukashenko that it was going to pass a new Religion Law, to be prepared by June 2023 and reach the Parliament in September 2023.

No election in Belarus has been found to be free and fair by Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) election observers, and the regime violently repressed nationwide protests against election fraud.

On 2 June 2023, the regime published a draft of the proposed new Religion Law prepared by the Plenipotentiary for Religious and Ethnic Affairs Aleksandr Rumak. The regime claimed the draft Law was open for public comments from 5 to 15 June 2023. The Minsk-based Lawtrend Centre for Legal Transformation criticised the short time allowed for public comments, despite the “exceptional significance of the draft Law for religious and social life”.

The new Law was set to replace and harshen the highly restrictive 2002 Religion Law. Multiple civil society and Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant attempts after 2002 to change this Law, including a petition signed by over 50,000 people, were rejected by the regime and the organisers punished.

On 28 August 2023, three United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteurs – Anaïs Marin (Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus), Clément Nyaletsossi Voule (Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association), and Nazila Ghanea (Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief) – wrote to the regime expressing concerns that provisions in the proposed new Law “would fail to meet Belarus’ obligations under international human rights law”.

The Rapporteurs urged the regime to “review and reconsider certain key aspects of the law to ensure that it complies with Belarus’ international human rights law obligations”. They urged the regime not to “rush the process” of adopting the draft Law. As of 11 January 2024, the UN website records no response to the communication from the regime.

Justifying the new restrictions

In Plenipotentiary for Religious and Ethnic Affairs Rumak’s justification of the alleged need for the new Law, published on 2 June 2023 alongside the draft, he claimed that the 2002 Religion Law needed to be brought into line with the Constitution, as well as the “strengthening on the legislative level of new contemporary approaches in mutual relations between the state and religious communities”. He did not explain what these approaches are.

However, Plenipotentiary Rumak stated that in preparing the 2023 Law, the regime took account of various other Belarusian laws, as well as the Religion Laws of Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan. All these Religion Laws have been strongly criticised by human rights defenders for not complying with legally-binding international human rights obligations.

Plenipotentiary Rumak stated in his June 2023 justification for the Law that the regime wants, among other things, to: prevent officials from using their official position to influence people over their religious views; to ban religious communities from using any symbols apart from religious symbols; to ban the use of texts and images inciting religious discord and hatred; and ban “the activity of religious communities directed against the sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus, its constitutional system and civic accord”.

Plenipotentiary Rumak also stressed what he saw as the need to “correct” the 2002 Religion Law’s preamble to recognise the “special role” of the pro-regime Belarusian Orthodox Church (of the Moscow Patriarchate) in the “historical establishment and development of spiritual, cultural and state traditions of the Belarusian people, as well as the inseparability from the general history of the people of Belarus of other Christian, Jewish and Islamic religious communities”.

In the preamble to the draft Law made public on 2 June 2023 the Lutheran Church was not specifically mentioned, unlike in the 2002 Religion Law, and was replaced by a general “other Christian” category. However, the draft presented to parliament in September 2023 and now adopted includes the Lutheran Church alongside Judaism and Islam, removing any reference to “other Christians”.

Regime claimed draft Law “does not affect” international human rights obligations

On 28 August 2023, three United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteurs – Anaïs Marin (Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus), Clément Nyaletsossi Voule (Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association), and Nazila Ghanea (Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief) – wrote to the regime expressing concerns that provisions in the proposed new Law “would fail to meet Belarus’ obligations under international human rights law”.

They express specific concerns about: mandatory state registration; compulsory re-registration; tighter registration restrictions and conditions; increased monitoring and surveillance of religious organisations; restrictions on religious literature and items; monitoring and inspection of religious organisations; expansion of legal grounds allowing state authorities to dissolve religious organisations; and new restrictions on religious charitable activity.

The three Special Rapporteurs note: “In 2020, Belarus also supported a recommendation during the Universal Periodic Review to ensure that no restrictions are imposed on the right to freedom of religion and belief (A/HRC/46/5 para. 138.153).”

The Special Rapporteurs urged the regime to “review and reconsider certain key aspects of the law to ensure that it complies with Belarus’ international human rights law obligations”. They also urged the regime not to “rush the process” of adopting the draft Law.

Their observations refer, among other international standards and documents, to the November 2018 UN Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations on Belarus (CCPR/C/BLR/CO/5). These state: “The State party should guarantee the effective exercise of the freedom of religion in law and in practice, including by repealing the requirement of mandatory State registration of religious communities, and should refrain from any action that may restrict that freedom beyond the narrowly construed restrictions permitted under article 18 [“Freedom of thought, conscience and religion”] of the Covenant [the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – ICCPR].” The permissible restrictions are outlined in the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 22 on ICCPR Article 18.

Yet where Plenipotentiary Rumak’s justification talked about “compliance of the draft with international treaties and other international legal acts”, it falsely claimed that “the subject matter of the Draft Law does not affect the international treaties of the Republic of Belarus and international legal acts, in particular the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, etc”.

The man who answered Plenipotentiary Rumak’s phone – who refused to give his name – also refused to explain why Rumak made his demonstrably false claim, and refused to discuss the content of the draft Law. “We don’t comment on the draft Law,” he told Forum 18 on 13 June 2023 and then put the phone down.

“Playing on the formal appearance of legality”

Many people concerned about the impact of the proposed new Religion Law did not want to publicly criticise the new Law. “We don’t speak out with criticism publicly,” one individual told Forum 18 after the text of the draft Law was published, “as you could end up facing criminal responsibility.”

One Council of Churches Baptist – whose congregations choose not to seek state permission to exercise freedom of religion or belief – pointed to the new Law’s continuing ban on unregistered activity. “As the Bible says [Ecclesiastes 1:9], there’s nothing new under the sun,” the Baptist told Forum 18 on 11 January. Compulsory registration “began in the Soviet Union and nothing has changed”. The Baptist insists that their congregations “will stick to our firm position” not to seek state registration.

After the new Law was signed and officially published on 5 January 2024, members of various other religious communities declined to discuss their view of it with Forum 18.

Human rights defender and Orthodox priest Fr Aleksandr Shramko – who now lives in Lithuania – regarded the new Law as part of the continuing regime crackdown on society. “It adopts new laws, corrects old ones – everything in order to somehow extinguish any pockets of not only possible resistance, but also any uncontrolled life,” he wrote on the Christian Vision website on 13 June 2023. “All this looks somewhat absurd on the part of the authorities, which are ‘not living by the law’. But after all, animals also want to be like people, playing on the formal appearance of legality.”

Fr Shramko said that the regime’s religious policy “is characterised by a wary attitude towards religion and the desire to keep it in maximum isolation from society”.

Fr Shramko argued that new provisions in the then draft new Law “are mainly aimed at strengthening the strictness of these provisions and placing the activities of religious communities under the maximum control of the state, up to demands to conform to the regime’s ideology and policies”.

Local human Rights defenders continued to criticise the draft new Law. “The Lukashenko regime has also now increased control over religion,” the banned allegedly “extremist” Honest People human rights defenders group noted on 15 August 2023. “An entire law was rewritten for this purpose.” The group said that, according to the draft text made public in June, the new version constitutes “total over-control, morphing into complete prohibitions and restrictions”.

The Baptist Union, Pentecostal Union, Full Gospel and Seventh-day Adventist Churches sent joint comments on the draft Law to the Plenipotentiary’s Office. “Some of them were taken into account,” the Head of the Baptist Union Leonid Mikhovich told Forum 18 on 11 January 2024.

Fr Yuri Sanko, spokesperson for the Catholic Bishops’ Conference, told Forum 18 on 17 October 2023 that “for our Church there is nothing to worry about regarding this law”. “We might have discomfort from total re-registration, but we don’t expect any difficulties.” He added that the Catholic Church hopes that the new Law would help to open more orphanages. “As far as I know, just one orphanage in Belarus functions in a convent.”

“We look at the new law with caution,” a Protestant pastor who asked not to be identified for fear of state reprisals told Forum 18 on 13 October 2023. “It promises nothing good, but it depends on how formally it will be applied as the wording in some parts is obscure.” The pastor noted the “endlessly expanding” list of reasons the state could use to liquidate religious communities. “If desired, they may be applied to any religious organisation.”

The pastor noted that re-registration may be a problem especially for small countryside communities, for example in northern Belarus or the western Brest Region. “The number of believers is limited due to the small population.” The pastor expressed concern also about the great attention the Law pays to Sunday schools.

The Head of the Baptist Union, Leonid Mikhovich, said their “main concern” was the requirement to have 20 founders for registering a religious community. “In some villages we do not have the required number of people, while the law provides no other option other than to have 20 people to be allowed to hold regular worship meetings,” he told Forum 18 on 16 October 2023. He noted that a similar requirement in the 2002 Law “does not affect our churches”.

After the adoption of the new Law, Mikhovich repeated his concern about the absence of any provision for the legal existence of communities with fewer than 20 people. “The number of founders was not reduced,” he told Forum 18. “Difficulties are still possible where it is not possible to gather 20 founders. But until we have started the process, it is difficult to say how the issue will be resolved.”

“Many of our communities will fail the state re-registration, mostly those in the countryside where there are not many people,” a member of the Religious Board of Muslims in Belarus, who asked not to be identified for fear of state reprisals, told Forum 18 on 17 October 2023. “There is also a risk that our religious association, the Muftiate, will not have enough member communities for registration.”

“I have not seen the final text but judging by the draft it will bring nothing good,” another Muslim, who also asked not to be identified, told Forum 18 from Minsk on 11 January 2024. The Muslim repeated earlier fears that their national religious organisation, the Religious Board of Muslims in Belarus, might be forced to end its existence. “The main problem is the number of believers below which many small communities will fail re-registration.”

Asked whether the Muslim community sent comments and proposals on the draft Law, the Muslim answered: “No, we did not even try. What’s the point? They would not be taken into account.”

A member of the Minsk community of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (commonly known as the Mormons), who asked not to be identified for fear of state reprisals, also expressed concern about re-registration. “Some of our believers might feel uneasy to disclose their personal information, which is demanded at re-registration,” the individual told Forum 18 on 16 October 2023. “Many communities rent buildings for worship, while others cannot find any and have to meet online.”

Draft Law reaches parliament

Following the 2 June 2023 publication of the draft Law, officials continued to revise it with no public consultation. Among the changes were the removal of: a ban on educational establishments having religious material in their libraries; a requirement that religious organisations would have to provide names of children and annual reports on their Sunday schools; and references to alleged “Nazism”.

The title of the draft Law was also changed to the Law “on amendments to laws on questions of the activity of religious organisations”. As well as including the text of the new Religion Law, the draft also included amendments to the Civil Code.

The draft Law was presented to the lower chamber of the non-freely elected parliament on 29 September 2023, and the text of the draft Law as presented to parliament was made public on the regime’s legal website on about 10 October. In an analysis on 11 October 2023, the independent news website Zerkalo (working in exile as the regime has banned it as “extremist”) noted the new restrictions and requirement for all registered religious organisations to undergo re-registration.

Why a new Religion Law?

Some parts of the new Religion Law parallel the 2023 Political Parties and other Public Associations Law, which made it significantly harder to form such groups, especially nationwide. Religious communities are the second group after political parties to be forced to undergo compulsory state registration in order for the regime to allow them to exist. The new Religion Law is also hostile to any connection between exercising freedom of religion or belief and potentially opposition political activity (see below).

“Earlier this year, all opposition parties were liquidated in this manner,” Zerkalo noted. “Apparently, having ‘cleaned up’ most spheres of public life, the authorities finally got round to religion and decided not to limit themselves to targeted measures like arresting ‘wrong’ priests, so now there will also be fewer churches.”

On 20 December 2023, two leading state officials warned hundreds of Orthodox clergy that those violating strict state restrictions would face punishment. Olga Chemodanova, Head of the Ideology Department of Minsk City Executive Committee, told priests of Minsk Orthodox Diocese that during the past year, state agencies had “monitored” more than 500 religious communities. Officials had prevented the distribution of “extremist” literature and had discovered that prayers were being said in church for the victory of Ukraine in the war (something she clearly did not like).

In his address, Plenipotentiary for Religious and Ethnic Affairs Aleksandr Rumak warned the Orthodox clergy forcefully that there was to be no politics in church. He also warned that no “non-religious symbols” should be displayed in churches.

New Law adopted, signed

On 11 October 2023, the House of Representatives approved the new Law in its first reading, and on 29 November 2023 in its second reading. Deputy Lyudmila Zdorikova led consideration of the Law in the lower chamber of parliament.

“The draft law introduces new modern approaches to interaction of the state with religious organisations,” deputy Zdorikova claimed to state TV channel CTV.by on 11 October 2023, after the first reading. “The draft has been worked out in close cooperation with religious leaders and the academic community. The draft was discussed publicly.”

Forum 18 asked Andrei Aryaev, Head of the Religious Department of the Plenipotentiary’s Office, on 12 October 2023 why it was necessary to change the Religion Law and whether the proposals from religious organisations were considered in the amended text. “I won’t give any comments,” he responded.

Forum 18 reached Mariya Ignatenko, assistant to parliamentary deputy Zdorikova, on 13 October 2023. She listened to the questions about the new Law without saying anything then put the phone down.

The upper chamber of parliament, the Council of the Republic, approved the new Law on 13 December 2023, it announced that day on its Telegram channel.

Aleksandr Lukashenko signed the Law on 30 December 2023, though his press service did not announce this until 3 January 2024. Its statement said he signed the Laws “correcting laws in questions of the activity of religious organisations”. It stressed the more restrictive conditions for registering nationwide religious organisations.

The regime’s legal website officially published the text of the new Law on 5 January 2024. The new Religion Law, the largest part of the new Law, comes into force on 5 July 2024, six months after official publication.

Forum 18 asked to speak to Plenipotentiary Rumak on 4 January 2024. His secretary asked what Forum 18 wanted to talk about. When Forum 18 explained that it had questions about the new Religion Law, as well as about his address to the Minsk clergy in December 2023, the secretary responded: “Aleksandr Rumak does not give interviews by phone.” She would not explain why not.

Compulsory state permission to exercise freedom of religion or belief remains

The new Religion Law – which comes into force on 5 July 2024 – continues to require all religious communities to gain state registration before they are allowed to operate. Article 15 declares: “Religious activity in Belarus without the creation of religious organisations and their state registration is banned.” The previous Law stated that the only religious communities which may “unobstructed” exercise their freedom of religion and belief are state-registered religious communities within state-approved places of worship or other venues.

Baptist Council of Churches Any activity by unregistered or liquidated religious communities can lead to prosecution under Criminal Code Article 193-1. This punishes “organisation of or participation in activity by an unregistered political party, foundation, civil or religious organisation” with a fine or imprisonment for up to two years. Article 193-1 was removed from the Criminal Code in July 2019, but was restored almost unchanged in January 2022.

The ban on and punishment for exercising freedom of religion or belief without state permission is against international law, as outlined in the OSCE / Council of Europe Venice Commission Guidelines on the Legal Personality of Religious or Belief Communities. This notes: “State permission may not be made a condition for the exercise of the freedom of religion or belief. The freedom of religion or belief, whether manifested alone or in community with others, in public or in private, cannot be made subject to prior registration or other similar procedures, since it belongs to human beings and communities as rights holders and does not depend on official authorization.”

A member of the Council of Churches Baptists – who do not seek state permission to exercise freedom of religion or belief – insisted to Forum 18 in June 2023 that their communities “will carry on doing what we do” regardless of what new Law is adopted.

On 2 June 2023, a judge fined Council of Churches Baptist Vladimir Burshtyn – who is in his 70s – over a month’s average pension for an outdoor meeting in Drogichin with fellow Baptists to share their faith. He was one of at least 11 individuals known to have been punished in 2023 under Administrative Code Article 24.23 (“Violation of the procedure for organising or conducting a mass event or demonstration”) for exercising freedom of religion or belief without state permission. Ten were fined and the other jailed for ten days.

Compulsory re-registration required between July 2024 and July 2025

Article 4 of the Religion Law requires all registered religious communities to bring their statutes into line with the provisions of the new Law and apply for re-registration within one year of the Law entering legal force (5 July 2024) or to close down. It appears that if religious communities fail to get the compulsory re-registration by 5 July 2025, all their activity would become illegal.

Compulsory re-registration linked with denials of communities’ existing legal status is illegal under international law. As the OSCE / Council of Europe Venice Commission Guidelines on the Legal Personality of Religious or Belief Communities note: “In cases where new provisions to the system governing access to legal personality of religious or belief communities are introduced, adequate transition rules should guarantee the rights of existing communities. Where laws operate retroactively .. (for example, requiring reapplication for legal personality status under newly-introduced criteria), the state is under a duty to show that such restrictions are compliant with the criteria set out in Part I of these Guidelines.”

(The Guidelines’ Part 1 outlines the permissible restrictions on the freedom of religion or belief, including that “limitations may not be retroactively or arbitrarily imposed on specific individuals or groups; neither may they be imposed by rules that purport to be laws, but which are so vague that they do not give fair notice of what the law requires or which allow for arbitrary enforcement”.)

The Guidelines go on to note that “the state must demonstrate the objective reasons that would justify a change in existing legislation, and show that the proposed legislation does not interfere with the freedom of religion or belief more than is strictly necessary in light of those objective reasons”.

Religious communities are the second group of organisations (after political parties, which had to apply to be re-registered by June 2023) that are being required to undergo “total re-registration”, Lawtrend Centre for Legal Transformation pointed out. Political parties also had to apply for re-registration within one year.

After the 2002 Religion Law was adopted, religious communities were given two years until November 2004 to undergo compulsory re-registration. The regime at that time obstructed many religious communities’ attempts to seek state registration.

As of 1 January 2023, according to the Plenipotentiary’s Office, 3,590 religious communities had state registration, 3,417 individual communities and 173 larger communities.

Almost every religious leader Forum 18 spoke to as officials were preparing the Law pointed out that many religious communities will face problems with re-registration. Exiled Orthodox priest Fr Aleksandr Shramko fears that when religious communities apply for re-registration, “those objectionable to the authorities may not get through”.

“Our community in Minsk which is in the process of registration might have a problem as it is not numerous and it is difficult to find more members,” the head of the Lutheran community in Grodno Igor Grigus told Forum 18.

The leader of the Religious Board of Muslims in Belarus, Ali Voronovich, commented that in many places it may be impossible to find the required number of members to register a community. “Many communities in villages and small towns will cease to exist, and it does not concern only Muslim communities,” he told Forum 18 on 8 June.

The member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints also expressed concern about registration provisions. “It might be a problem not only for us.”

Even tighter registration restrictions

Article 12 of the new Religion Law continues to require leaders of registered religious communities to be Belarusian citizens, but adds that they must also be permanent residents of Belarus.

Individuals who are on either the “List of organisations and individuals involved in terrorist activities” or the “List of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, foreign citizens or stateless persons involved in extremist activities” are banned from being leaders or founders of registered religious organisations.

The regime maintains multiple similar lists targeting anyone, any organisation, any document, any communication, or any website the regime dislikes, such as the “Republican List of Extremist Materials” (see below).

Article 15 requires registered religious organisations to notify the registering authority of the appointment of a new leader within 10 working days. Depending on the type of religious community (eg. national religious organisations, monasteries, etc.), the registering authority is either the Plenipotentiary’s Office or local administrations.

Article 13 specifies that religious communities (the lowest level of registered religious organisation) are allowed to operate only in the place of their registration.

Under Article 16, religious communities have to supply with a registration application not only their statute, but a certificate confirming a place to conduct their activity (which can be difficult in small towns and villages). They also need to submit a list of the 20 or more adult founding members who live in one locality or neighbouring localities, with each person’s date of birth, citizenship, address, place of work or study, phone number and signature.

Many people are reluctant to provide such information to a regime which commits serious human rights violations against the people it rules. The requirement for a minimum of 20 adult founder members will also prevent many smaller or rural religious communities from gaining registration. Leonid Mikhovich of the Baptist Union echoed these concerns to Forum 18 on 11 January 2024, particularly pointing to the requirement that founders have to give the authorities extensive personal information.”It is still necessary during registration to submit information about their place of work.”

As the OSCE / Council of Europe Venice Commission Guidelines on the Legal Personality of Religious or Belief Communities note: “Any procedure that provides religious or belief communities with access to legal personality status should not set burdensome requirements. Examples of burdensome requirements that are not justified under international law include, but are not limited to, the following: that the registration application be signed by all members of the religious organization and contain their full names, dates of birth and places of residence.”

The Guidelines also state that: “legislation should not make obtaining legal personality contingent on a religious or belief community having an excessive minimum number of members”.

The new Religion Law mentions no possibility for religious communities which have fewer than the required 20 locally-resident adult citizen members to lodge a registration application.

Religious communities have to in their registration application provide extensive extra information if they were “previously unknown in Belarus”. This includes the origin and “worship practice” of their faith, as well as their attitude to the family and marriage, the health of their followers, and the “carrying out of state obligations”. Applications from such communities are sent to the Plenipotentiary’s Office for a religious studies “expert analysis”, which can last up to six months.

The UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 22 on Article 18 (“Freedom of thought, conscience and religion”) of the ICCPR states that the Committee “views with concern any tendency to discriminate against any religion or belief for any reasons, including the fact that they are newly established”.

The OSCE / Council of Europe Venice Commission Guidelines on the Legal Personality of Religious or Belief Communities note: “The state must respect the autonomy of religious or belief communities when fulfilling its obligation to provide them with access to legal personality. .. states should observe their obligations by ensuring that national law leaves it to the religious or belief community itself to decide on .. the substantive content of its beliefs .. In particular, the state should refrain from a substantive as opposed to a formal review of the statute and character of a religious organization.”

Higher level organisations are divided into national and regional religious communities, which both require registration by the Plenipotentiary’s Office.

Article 14 of the new Religion Law requires national religious communities to have at least 15 member communities in all seven regions of the country (compared to 10 in the previous Law), at least one of which had had state registration for at least 30 years. In his June 2023 justification for the Law, Plenipotentiary Rumak stated that an aim of the new Law is to change the registration procedure “limiting through this the possibility to create a nationwide registered religious organisation”. He did not explain why the state aims to limit the number of communities eligible to apply for national religious organisation status.

This parallels the 2023 Political Parties and other Public Associations Law, which made it significantly harder to form such groups, especially nationwide.

Regional religious communities have to have at least 10 religious communities in one or several regions, at least one of which had had state registration for at least 30 years.

Only national or regional organisations have the right to found monasteries, missions and religious educational establishments, which themselves require state registration.

“Extremism”

The new Law makes wide use of the term “extremist”, a term widely used in other laws, as banned Belarusian human rights group Human Constanta noted on 5 June 2023, along with international human rights groups Access Now, Article 19, and the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT).

“The corpus of Belarusian ‘anti-extremism’ laws lacks sufficient precision and grants the authorities unfettered discretion to restrict the freedom of expression and other human rights,” the human rights groups noted in a submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, Anaïs Marin.

Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, noted in her January 2020 report (A/HRC/43/46/Add.1) after visiting Kazakhstan: “the counter-terrorism and extremism regimes provide excessive leeway to the authorities to target and silence those who peacefully question the established order, including various civil society actors, human rights defenders, trade unionists, journalists, bloggers, and members of marginalized communities or of communities legitimately exercising their religious freedoms. The overwhelming focus on extremism has no justification under international law.”

Ní Aoláin’s February 2020 general report on Human rights impact of policies and practices aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism (A/HRC43/46) repeated this point, stating that all “States that regulate ‘extremism’ in their laws, policy, programmes or practice should repeal such provisions, which have no purchase in international law, and domestic law must comply with the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality.”

The regime labels an extraordinarily wide range of activity as “extremist”. Human Constanta regularly documents such cases, including in its April – June 2023 overview. It noted earlier in 2023 the jailing of the administrator of a social media group for three years for distributing educational information about the Belarusian language.

On 12 December 2023, the Supreme Court in Minsk upheld the lower court decision to liquidate Minsk’s New Life Full Gospel Church. Deputy Head of Minsk City Executive Committee’s Ideology, Religion, and Ethnic Affairs Coordination Department Yekaterina Kaverina had initiated the liquidation suit because local courts had found some of the Church’s online materials “extremist”.

Among online material, a Greek Catholic news website and a YouTube interview with a Catholic priest who fled to neighbouring Poland in 2021 to escape prosecution are among religious items banned by local courts as “extremist” in late 2022 and added to the Information Ministry’s “Republican List of Extremist Materials“.

In autumn 2023, courts declared materials from Christian Vision (a group which documents violations of freedom of religion or belief and other human rights) and Minsk’s New Life Church “extremist”. On 26 December 2023, a Vitebsk court banned as “extremist” a YouTube channel, a Telegram channel and a Facebook page belonging to exiled Catholic priest Fr Vyacheslav Barok.

Christian Vision expressed concern about the growing list of websites, channels and social networks of religious figures and communities courts have declared “extremist”. “This is done in order to artificially create obstacles to the dissemination of this information, limit its receipt by people who are in Belarus.” Christian Vision pointed out in a 21 September 2023 report that even a link on a mobile phone “becomes a reason for persecution of a person who is interested in obtaining independent and important information that concerns Christianity and the modern political crisis”.

“The authorities are thus trying to reduce the influence of religious leaders, activists and communities commenting on events in Belarus and repressions committed against believers and their communities,” Christian Vision noted.

Deputy Information Minister Igor Buzovsky, who is also Deputy Chair of the “Republican Expert Commission for the Evaluation of Symbols, Attributes, and Information Products for the presence (or absence) in them of signs of Extremism”, insisted to Forum 18 in January 2023 that “This is done exclusively on the basis of the law.”

However, Deputy Information Minister Buzovsky refused to discuss the banning of the Tsarkva Greek Catholic website or other religious publications. “You speak about one website – I wouldn’t want to talk from memory. You need to apply officially.” He refused to discuss anything else about why religious publications are banned and put the phone down.

New powers for regime to inspect, monitor religious communities

There is currently surveillance by the KGB secret police of religious believers, along with monitoring of and restrictions on religious communities by the Plenipotentiary for Religious and Ethnic Affairs and other state agencies.

Olga Chemodanova, Head of the Ideology Department of Minsk City Executive Committee, told priests of Minsk Orthodox Diocese at a clergy meeting on 20 December 2023 that during that year, state agencies had “monitored” more than 500 religious communities. Officials had prevented the distribution of “extremist” literature and had discovered that prayers were being said in church for the victory of Ukraine in the war (something she clearly did not like).

Article 40 of the new Religion Law continues explicit state surveillance of whether registered religious communities are abiding by the law. Such control continues to be enacted by the Plenipotentiary’s Office and local administrations.

Article 26 bans missionary activity and materials “contradicting the law and the ideology of the Belarusian state”. The “ideology of the Belarusian state” is not explained.

In his June 2023 justification for the Law, Plenipotentiary Rumak said that the new Law would “strengthen the rights for registering bodies [the Plenipotentiary’s Office and local administrations] to inspect the activity of religious communities under their statutes” to determine whether it is accord with the Religion Law. Rumak noted that the new Law would widen religious communities’ responsibility for violations of the Law, including over “carrying out extremist activity and attempts to revive Nazism, or illegal missionary activity”.

Greater “legal” possibilities for state to forcibly close religious communities

Under Article 41 of the new Religion Law, a failure to correct a “violation” within a set deadline or a repeated “violation” within a year continues to allow officials to go to court to liquidate (in effect ban) a religious community. Even before any court liquidation hearing, officials can suspend the religious community’s activity which would make anything it did illegal. Such a suspension cannot be legally challenged.

In his June 2023 justification for the Law, Plenipotentiary Rumak stressed the widening of the possibility for the state to liquidate registered religious communities and thus render any activity by them illegal.

Continuing restrictions on religious literature, items

Article 22 of the new Religion Law gives the Plenipotentiary the right to commission a religious studies “expert analysis” of any religious literature or items “with the aim of preventing the distribution of religious literature or other materials containing information inciting social, ethnic, religious or racial hatred and other extremist manifestations”.

Cultural or educational organisations receiving religious printed, audio or video materials must now seek an “expert analysis” from the Plenipotentiary (earlier versions of the new Law said only that they “have the right” to seek such “expert analyses”).

This largely continues the existing compulsory prior state censorship of and restrictions on the distribution of most religious literature and objects, which runs in parallel with the threat of banning texts or websites as allegedly “extremist”.

Article 27 of the new Religion Law allows only registered religious organisations to produce, import, export or distribute “religious literature, other printed, audio- and video-materials, as well as other objects of religious significance”. The Council of Ministers draws up a list of such “objects of religious significance”.

Religious literature, audio and video materials “must not contradict the ideology of the Belarusian state” or contain “propaganda of war, social, ethnic, religious or racial hatred and other extremist activity”. The “ideology of the Belarusian state” is not explained.

As under the previous 2002 Law, under Article 27 of the new Religion Law religious communities have to present all imported religious literature or materials “for conducting missionary and other non-cult activity” to the Plenipotentiary’s Office for it to decide whether to commission a religious studies “expert analysis”. All such literature or materials continue to be required to include the full name of the registered religious and its religious affiliation.

Only religious communities continue to be allowed to distribute printed, audio and video materials on religion and continue to be allowed to do so only on their premises or, if they get permission from local administrations, in other premises.

The Catholic Bishops’ Conference commented as the Law was in preparation that these restrictions on distribution “put religious literature in a discriminatory position compared to other literature that can be distributed through specialised bookshops”.

Commercial organisations continue to be banned from publishing religious literature or from producing items to be used in religious worship.

Religious education restricted, under regime surveillance

Article 10 of the new Religion Law imposes new restrictions on religious education of children and adults. Registered religious communities can provide such education only if it is in their statutes and only in premises they own or rent, unless those rented premises are owned by educational establishments, or organisations and business people providing education.

“This could put in a difficult position both rural parishes and recently-formed urban communities building their own buildings in new urban areas,” 15 June 2023 comments signed by “Grodno Diocese of the Belarusian Orthodox Church” below the draft Law on the government’s legal website noted.

The religious education of adults, young people, and children, as well as related materials, must not “contradict the ideology of generally accepted traditional values of the Belarusian people or the ideology of the Belarusian state” or “contain propaganda of war, social, ethnic or religious hatred”. Neither “the ideology of generally accepted traditional values of the Belarusian people” nor “the ideology of the Belarusian state” is explained.

Children can take part in these classes only with a signed application from a parent or guardian.

Religious communities are required in their religious education to “cooperate” with local and other state authorities.

In January 2024, Mikhovich of the Baptist Union welcomed the removal in the final version of the draft Law’s requirement that both parents or guardians needed to sign an application for their child to attend religious classes. He also welcomed the removal of a provision that would have required religious organisations to present information about their religious education of children to local executive bodies.

The provisions covering religious education in the Law “reveal the regime’s wariness towards any uncontrolled influence on minds, especially of the youth”, exiled Orthodox priest Fr Shramko noted as the Law was in preparation.

The Catholic Bishops’ Conference expressed concern before the Law was finally adopted that applications from parents or guardians for children to attend religion classes held by religious communities, could be subject to inspection by officials. “An obligation could be placed in future on religious communities to provide the controlling agencies lists of named children who are studying, with the attached applications from parents,” it noted. This would force parents and children to reveal any religious affiliation, it added, which is illegal under international human rights law.

Catholic Archbishop Iosif Stanevsky, speaking at a discussion of the then draft Law in parliament’s House of Representatives on 3 November 2023, “emphasised the right of believers to a certain anonymity and protection of personal data when teaching children religion”, according to a report on the Church’s website the same day.

As the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 22 on ICCPR Article 18 (“Freedom of thought, conscience and religion”) states: “No one can be compelled to reveal his thoughts or adherence to a religion or belief.”

Fr Yuri Sanko, the spokesperson for the Catholic Bishops’ Conference, told Forum 18 in June 2023 that officials – mainly from local Executive Committees – had already demanded to know how many children are studying in religious education classes, but had not demanded the names of those children or their parents.

Regime inspections of Catholic parishes took place from March 2021, sometimes followed by prosecutions of priests. Prosecutors, as well as officials from local Ideology Departments at the request of prosecutors, demanded reports from priests, catechetical plans and other internal information about parish life.

Under Article 10 of the new Religion Law, religious education of children and adults has to be in the state languages (Belarusian or Russian). The Catholic Bishops’ Conference pointed out before the Law was finally adopted that as Belarus is a multi-ethnic state, this provision would deny ethnic minorities the right to teach their faith in their native language.

At the 3 November 2023 discussion, Archbishop Stanevsky stressed “the right of national minorities to teach children religion in their native language”, according to the Church’s report of his remarks.

The Minsk-based Muslim expressed doubt that the community would face problems over the language used in teaching. “The Koran is in Arabic, Jews have the Torah in Hebrew,” the Muslim pointed out to Forum 18 on 11 January 2024. “It would be a scandal if any changes are introduced and we do not teach Arabic.”

On 3 November 2023, journalists asked Plenipotentiary Rumak as he was entering parliament’s House of Representatives for the discussion of the then draft Law with officials and some religious leaders whether worship services in Polish would be banned. He answered “No”, Russian news agency Tass noted the same day. He said the ban on using non-state languages would apply only to religious education, not to religious worship.

Separating religious communities from involvement with wider society

Neither the new Law nor Plenipotentiary Aleksandr Rumak’s June 2023 justification for the Law specifically refer to attempts to prevent registered religious communities from involvement with wider society. However, several provisions appear designed to ensure this, possibly due to many nationwide belief-based protests against the regime’s election fraud and support of Russia’s renewed 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Many of these provisions are vaguely worded, which would allow officials to arbitrarily decide whether or not a religious community’s activity should lead to liquidation or punishment.

Article 8 of the new Religion Law includes the provision: “In places of worship, it is not allowed to use any symbols, except for religious ones, to hold meetings, rallies, picketing, election campaigning and other mass events of a political nature, propaganda of war, social, ethnic, religious and racial hatred, or other extremist activity, as well as speeches and appeals insulting representatives of state authorities, officials and individual citizens, and representatives of other faiths and their followers.”

Article 8 of the new Religion Law also bans the activity of religious communities or their representatives which are directed “against the sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus, the basic directions of Belarus’ internal and external policies, its constitutional system and civic accord”, or are accompanied by violations of the rights and freedom of individuals, as well as “obstructing the carrying out by individuals of their state, public and family obligations” or “cause harm to their health or morals”.

“Cult property” cannot be used for purposes other than those set out in a registered religious community’s statute, “including for political aims, as well as for terrorist and other extremist activity”.

New restrictions on religious charity

Article 29 of the new Religion Law allows registered religious organisations to conduct “charitable and social activity”. However, only monasteries are allowed to establish children’s homes with local administration approval.

(The June 2023 draft of the Law would have allowed any registered religious organisation to establish children’s homes with local administration approval.)

The 2002 Religion Law similarly allowed registered religious organisations to conduct charitable activity, but this has not stopped the regime blocking and closing religious-based charitable and other social justice initiatives.

In January 2022, the Presidential Administration’s Humanitarian Activity Department refused to allow a Protestant Church in Vitebsk Region to get a shipment of humanitarian aid (including wheelchairs, clothes, footwear and furniture) sent from other parts of Europe.

In early 2021, the Humanitarian Activity Department refused to allow the Minsk Catholic Archdiocese’s charity Caritas to accept foreign money to support a project to help poor and homeless people. The project aimed to support about 700 people in need with food, as well as plants and animals to grow for food.

In February 2013, the regime stripped legal status from the House of Mary shelter for 13 homeless people, run by young Catholic layman Aleksei Shchedrov in his home village. After police visits, he was forced to close the shelter.

Source

4 January 2024
Felix Corley, Forum 18

Olga Chemodanova, Head of Minsk City Executive Committee’s Ideology Department, warned a Minsk Orthodox Diocese clergy meeting not to violate the state’s strict restrictions. “Her address contained open threats towards priests who are ideologically alien,” Christian Vision noted. “Chemodanova gave them to understand that they should expect prison.” Religious affairs official Aleksandr Rumak warned that there should be no politics in church and no “non-religious symbols”. The warnings echo provisions of the now-adopted new Religion Law. The Supreme Court upheld the liquidation of Minsk’s New Life Church.

Two leading state officials warned hundreds of Orthodox clergy that those violating strict state restrictions would face punishment. Olga Chemodanova, Head of the Ideology Department of Minsk City Executive Committee, told priests of Minsk Orthodox Diocese that during the past year, state agencies had “monitored” more than 500 religious communities. Officials had prevented the distribution of “extremist” literature and had discovered that prayers were being said in church for the victory of Ukraine in the war (something she clearly did not like).

In his address at the clergy meeting on 20 December 2023, Plenipotentiary for Religious and Ethnic Affairs Aleksandr Rumak (the regime’s senior religious affairs official) warned the clergy forcefully that there was to be no politics in church. He also warned that no “non-religious symbols” should be displayed in churches (see below).

Rumak’s warnings echoed some of the provisions of the new Religion Law, approved by the non-freely elected parliament in December 2023 and signed into law by Aleksandr Lukashenko on 30 December 2023 (see forthcoming F18News article).

Fr Aleksandr Shramko, who served in Minsk Orthodox Diocese until November 2019, says that the Plenipotentiary for Religious and Ethnic Affairs and some of his officials would sometimes attend clergy meetings. “It was not so often, but it happened.” However, he does not recall Ideology Department officials attending and speaking. Nor does he recall officials threatening the clergy during meetings he attended (see below).

Fr Aleksandr says the situation changed in 2020, the year of mass protests at the falsified presidential elections. “Until then, the authorities believed that all was under control. They had contact with the hierarchy and believed the Church was under control,” he told Forum 18. “But they discovered it wasn’t so. They understood that they needed to step up the pressure, not just on the hierarchy but on the lower clergy” (see below).

Reached on 3 January 2024, Chemodanova told Forum 18 she was busy and asked it to call back in 15 minutes. She did not subsequently answer her phone. Forum 18 asked to speak to Plenipotentiary Rumak on 4 January. His secretary asked what Forum 18 wanted to talk about. When Forum 18 explained that it had questions about his address to the Minsk clergy as well as the new Religion Law, the secretary responded: “Aleksandr Rumak does not give interviews by phone.” She would not explain why not (see below).

The secretary of Minsk Diocese, Fr Andrei Volkov, did not respond to Forum 18’s question as to whether the Diocese had invited Chemodanova and Rumak to address the clergy meeting or if the two officials had themselves decided to attend (see below).

Chemodanova drafted letters on behalf of Minsk City Executive Committee in 2022 threatening the city’s New Life Full Gospel Church over holding Sunday services in the car park of its confiscated church building, which the regime bulldozed in June 2023 (see below).

On 12 December 2023, the Supreme Court in Minsk upheld the lower court decision to liquidate New Life Church. Deputy Head of Minsk City Executive Committee’s Ideology, Religion, and Ethnic Affairs Coordination Department Yekaterina Kaverina – who initiated the liquidation suit – again appeared in court to support it. She had called for the Church’s liquidation because local courts had found some of the Church’s online materials “extremist”. She also claimed that the Church had conducted activity not set out in its statute (see below).

Kaverina insisted to church members in the court room that she was a state official and had no choice in bringing the suit against New Life Church. Church members asked her if it was not absurd that a thousand-member Church was being liquidated because of an online video that had been deleted. She insisted that the court would decide (see below).

Kaverina refused to answer any questions. “I will not give you any comment,” she told Forum 18, before putting the phone down (see below).

Now that New Life Church has been liquidated, any future activity in the exercise of freedom of religion or belief could lead to a fine or jail term (see below).

At least 11 individuals in 2023 are known to have been punished under Administrative Code Article 24.23 (“Violation of the procedure for organising or conducting a mass event or demonstration”) for exercising freedom of religion or belief without state permission. Ten were fined up to two months’ average wage, while the other received a ten-day jail term (see below).

Officials warn clergy against violating strict state restrictions

Two leading state officials warned hundreds of Orthodox clergy that those violating strict state restrictions would face punishment. The officials were speaking to the 239 participants in a clergy meeting of Minsk Diocese of the Belarusian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, held in Minsk’s Belarus hotel on 20 December 2023.

The warnings came in speeches to the meeting by Olga Chemodanova, Head of the Ideology Department of Minsk City Executive Committee, and Aleksandr Rumak, Plenipotentiary for Religious and Ethnic Affairs (the regime’s senior religious affairs official). The Minsk Diocese’s account of the clergy meeting published on the Church website the same day noted only that the two officials spoke about “current issues of church-state relations”.

However, Christian Vision, a group which documents violations of freedom of religion or belief and other human rights, notes the threats, particularly from Chemodanova. “Her address contained open threats towards priests who are ideologically alien,” it said on 22 December. “Chemodanova gave them to understand that they should expect prison.”

(In August and September 2023, three different courts declared Christian Vision’s social media sites and logo “extremist”. They were then added to the Republican List of Extremist Materials.)

Chemodanova told the clergy that during the past year, state agencies had “monitored” more than 500 religious communities. During such “monitoring”, officials had prevented the distribution of “extremist” literature and had discovered that prayers were being said in church for the victory of Ukraine in the war (something she clearly did not like). She particularly singled out one priest.

Chemodanova complained that 75 per cent of Orthodox priests in Minsk do not speak up in the (state-run) media, with only St Elisabeth’s convent and All Saints Church (both known as loyal to the regime) doing so.

Chemodanova demanded that parish websites be “brought into order”, adding that their content was being monitored, according to Christian Vision.

In his address, Plenipotentiary Rumak warned the clergy forcefully that there was to be no politics in church. He also warned that no “non-religious symbols” should be displayed in churches.

Forum 18 tried to find out why the two officials warned and threatened Minsk Orthodox Diocese’s clergy and who had initiated their participation in the meeting.

Reached on 3 January 2024, Chemodanova told Forum 18 she was busy and asked it to call back in 15 minutes. She did not subsequently answer her phone that day or on 4 January.

Forum 18 asked to speak to Plenipotentiary Rumak on 4 January. His secretary asked what Forum 18 wanted to talk about. When Forum 18 explained that it had questions about his address to the Minsk clergy as well as the new Religion Law, the secretary responded: “Aleksandr Rumak does not give interviews by phone.” She would not explain why not.

On 4 January, Forum 18 asked the secretary of Minsk Diocese, Fr Andrei Volkov, in writing whether the Diocese had invited Chemodanova and Rumak to address the clergy meeting or if the two officials had themselves decided to attend. Forum 18 had received no response by the end of the working day in Minsk of 4 January.

Dozens of Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant clergy and laypeople have been given fines or short-term jail sentences since 2020, especially for sharing or liking news items on social media from websites the regime has declared “extremist”, as Christian Vision has documented.

A number of clergy have fled Belarus, fearing possible punishment. Orthodox priest Fr Andrei Nozdrin left his parish in the village of Komotovo in the western Grodno Region after the liturgy on 25 December 2023. He is now in Poland, he announced on his Facebook page on 30 December 2023. In April 2022, police warned Fr Andrei, and his Diocese transferred him to a remote parish, after he publicly opposed Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine, Belarus’ role in this, and his congregation sang the hymn Mighty God, which the regime has tried to ban.

“There weren’t threats” from officials at earlier clergy meetings

Fr Aleksandr Shramko, who served in Minsk Orthodox Diocese until it banned him from serving in November 2019, says that the Plenipotentiary for Religious and Ethnic Affairs and some of his officials would sometimes attend clergy meetings. “It was not so often, but it happened,” he told Forum 18 on 4 January from Lithuania, where he how lives. “It was always the then Plenipotentiary Leonid Gulyako or one of his officials, never someone from the Ideology Department.”

Fr Aleksandr does not recall officials threatening the clergy during meetings he attended. “We were able to ask questions. I asked Gulyako a question, and his response was insulting towards me rather than answering the question. But there weren’t threats.”

Fr Aleksandr says the situation changed in 2020, the year of mass protests at the falsified presidential elections. “Until then, the authorities believed that all was under control. They had contact with the hierarchy and believed the Church was under control,” he told Forum 18. “But they discovered it wasn’t so. They understood that they needed to step up the pressure, not just on the hierarchy but on the lower clergy.”

Officials’ warnings reinforce provisions of new Religion Law

In their addresses to Minsk Orthodox Diocese clergy, Olga Chemodanova and Aleksandr Rumak were reinforcing state restrictions to be imposed just weeks later in the repressive new Religion Law.

Plenipotentiary Rumak – whose office drafted the new Law – stated in his June 2023 justification for it that the regime wants, among other things, to ban religious communities from using any symbols apart from religious symbols and ban “the activity of religious communities directed against the sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus, its constitutional system and civic accord”.

The proposed Law was approved by the lower chamber of the regime’s non-freely elected parliament, the House of Representatives, on 29 November 2023 and by the upper chamber, the Council of the Republic, on 13 December 2023. Aleksandr Lukashenko then signed it into law on 30 December 2023, though his press service did not announce this until 3 January 2024 (see forthcoming F18News article).

Plenipotentiary Rumak also told the assembled priests that the Belarusian Orthodox Church had more foreign citizens working in religious roles than any other religious community in Belarus.

The regime has consistently tried to reduce the number of foreign citizens the Plenipotentiary allows to work in registered religious organisations. The Plenipotentiary has often rejected applications by leaders of religious organisations for permission to bring in foreign citizens, including applications by Orthodox and Catholic bishops.

The last foreign Catholic priest known to have been forced to leave Belarus was Polish citizen Fr Jozef Geza, who had served as parish priest in the western city of Grodno since 1997. He left in December 2022 after Plenipotentiary Rumak refused his bishop’s request to extend permission for him to continue to serve in the country.

Chemodanova – from police spokesperson to ideologist

Police Colonel Olga Chemodanova was spokesperson for the Interior Ministry (which controls the police) from December 2018 until her removal in October 2021. During mass protests at the regime’s falsification of election results in autumn 2020, she defended the police’s brutal crackdown. The European Union added her to its sanctions list in June 2021.

Chemodanova was then appointed Head of the Ideology Department of Minsk City Executive Committee, where she has been involved in restricting religious communities’ rights to freedom of religion or belief.

Chemodanova drafted the 1 August 2022 official letter, signed by Deputy Chair of Minsk City Executive Committee Artyom Tsuran, warning New Life Full Gospel Church that it had broken the law by holding Sunday services in the car park of its confiscated building that summer without official permission. It warned that if the “violation” is repeated within a year, the regime’s senior religious affairs official, Plenipotentiary Rumak, could go to court to liquidate the Church, with a possible ban on its activity as the court considers the suit.

Chemodanova similarly drafted subsequent letters to New Life Church on behalf of Tsuran.

Years of state pressure on Minsk’s New Life Church

New Life Church was founded in Minsk in 1992, gaining state registration in December of that year. The Church is a member of the Full Gospel Union, headed by Bishop Leonid Voronenko, and has been led since its foundation by Pastor Vyacheslav Goncharenko.

The regime always refused to change the legal designation of the Church’s place of worship, a former cowshed. From 2009, officials repeatedly tried to evict the Church. On 17 February 2021, 30 police and court bailiffs forcibly evicted New Life from its building, using an angle grinder to cut the door lock to gain entry.

After being expelled from its own place of worship, New Life Church held its worship services in the car park outside each Sunday, whatever the weather. Minsk City Executive Committee refused to allow such meetings. Pastor Goncharenko was detained and fined in September 2022 under Administrative Code Article 24.23 (“Violation of the procedure for organising or conducting a mass event or demonstration”). Another pastor was similarly detained and fined.

On 25 September 2022, police banned the Church’s Sunday meeting for worship in its car park, threatening to detain anyone who did not leave. On 20 June 2023, officials bulldozed New Life’s church building.

New Life Church also faced tax demands. In August 2023, decisions from several courts declared some of the Church’s online materials “extremist”. Its website had already been blocked.

In August 2023, 20 armed police officers from the Organised Crime and Corruption Department searched Pastor Goncharenko’s home in Minsk. The following day, a court jailed him for 10 days and the Church’s youth pastor for 5 days. The jailing of Pastor Goncharenko appeared timed to prevent him taking part in the first of the court hearings to declare the Church’s internet materials “extremist”.

Supreme Court finally liquidates New Life Church

On 15 September 2023, Minsk City Executive Committee lodged a liquidation suit against New Life Full Gospel Church to Minsk City Court. The City Court upheld the suit on 17 October 2023. However, the Church appealed against the decision to the Supreme Court in Minsk. The decision did not come into force until the appeal was heard.

Deputy Head of Minsk City Executive Committee’s Ideology, Religion, and Ethnic Affairs Coordination Department Yekaterina Kaverina called for the Church’s liquidation because local courts had found some of the Church’s online materials “extremist”. She also claimed that the Church had conducted activity not set out in its statute. The Minsk City Court decision does not specify what that activity was.

At a two-hour hearing at the Supreme Court on the morning of 12 December 2023, a panel of three Judges led by Judge Sergei Nikolayev upheld Minsk City Executive Committee’s suit to liquidate New Life Church. Kaverina of Minsk City Executive Committee again appeared in court to support the liquidation suit.

Church members joined Pastor Vyacheslav Goncharenko at the Supreme Court for the appeal hearing. Sergiy Melyanets, a member of another Minsk Protestant Church, was also present to support church members. He noted the contrast with the lower court hearing, where only a small number of church members were allowed in the small court room, allegedly because of coronavirus restrictions. By contrast, some 20 church members were allowed to attend the Supreme Court hearing, he noted, with others waiting outside.

“There was not one police officer in the court room,” Melyanets noted on Facebook later that day. “This is very strange, given that the judges have gathered to consider the liquidation of an organisation that (in the authorities’ view) had engaged in extremist actions.”

The Church’s lawyer “repeated what had been said in earlier hearings that it was not allowed simply to take and liquidate the church which has served people, society, and God for 31 years simply because of several items placed on the internet which were deemed extremist. Even more so as the items were removed immediately after the court decision”, Melyanets noted. “It turns out that in our country you can,” he commented.

In his testimony, Pastor Goncharenko spoke of the work the Church had done over decades, including many social projects to help orphans, and those with drug and alcohol dependency. “We have worked and created for 31 years and here we suddenly discover that our church is being liquidated because we got involved in some kind of extremism,” he told the court. “This word is for me like an insult. It cannot be associated with us in any way.”

Asked about why the Church had not removed a video from three years earlier the court found extremist, Pastor Goncharenko reminded the court that Church member and retired deputy head of the Constitutional Court Valery Fadeyev that the videos did not represent “extremism”.

The chair of the Judges, Nikolayev, prevented Church members from speaking about its work over 31 years, insisting that they should speak only about the “issue in contention”.

City Executive Committee official Kaverina said little during the hearing, merely confirming its suit to liquidate New Life Church.

“After a few minutes the judges come out and read the decision. No surprises”

After nearly two hours, the Judges withdrew for about half an hour to consider their decision. “This was very strange,” Melyanets commented. “Usually in such hearings where I have been present (including when I was before the court), after the final presentation by both sides the Judge immediately took from their case the printed court decision, not hiding that the decision had been taken even before the court hearing.”

As they waited for the Judges to return, Church members asked Kaverina of the City Executive Committee why she had not spoken about the good the Church had done for society in cooperation with the Executive Committee. “In my time nothing good was done,” Melyanets quotes her as responding. The official admitted she had not long been in the job.

Kaverina insisted to church members in the court room that she was a state official and had no choice in bringing the suit against New Life Church. Church members asked her if it was not absurd that a thousand-member Church was being liquidated because of an online video that had been deleted. She insisted that the court would decide.

“After a few minutes the judges come out and read the decision,” Melyanets noted. “No surprises.” The Judges upheld the lower court decision liquidating New Life Church. The decision cannot be appealed further and came into force on being delivered in the court room.

Speaking in a video message to New Life’s supporters later on 12 December, Pastor Goncharenko confirmed that the Church was now liquidated in court. However, he likened the Church to a child. “When a child is born they are given a birth certificate. The birth certificate can be lost, burnt or destroyed, but the child remains.” He noted that thousands of believers – both from within the Full Gospel Union and outside – were praying for the Church.

As of 4 January 2024, the Supreme Court has not yet issued the decision in writing.

Kaverina of Minsk City Executive Committee refused to answer any questions. “I will not give you any comment,” she told Forum 18 on 3 January, before putting the phone down.

New Life Pastor questioned

On 22 December, the Investigative Committee summoned New Life Pastor Vyacheslav Goncharenko for questioning. He was released later in the day and returned home, his wife noted the same day.

Investigators questioned Pastor Goncharenko about a traffic accident on 10 July 2023, when a bus carrying 50 children going to the Church’s summer camp overturned due to a poorly-maintained road. No serious injuries were reported, and parents have not made any complaints about the accident, the camps, or New Life Church and its leadership.

On the same day, the state-controlled media Minsk Pravda published online a detailed report of the accident quoting the participants and the officials dealing with it. The article was written in neutral tones, without any criticism, stating that the reason for the accident was the poor quality of the road surface.

The next day, Minsk Pravda published a totally different article, and almost immediately Minsk Prosecutor’s Office started summoning people connected with the summer camp for questioning.

Threat of criminal prosecution

Now that New Life Church has been liquidated, any future activity in the exercise of freedom of religion or belief could lead to a fine or jail term.

Any activity by unregistered or liquidated religious communities can lead to prosecution under Criminal Code Article 193-1. This punishes “organisation of or participation in activity by an unregistered political party, foundation, civil or religious organisation” with a fine or imprisonment for up to two years.

At least eleven individuals given fines, short-term jailing in 2023

At least 11 individuals in 2023 are known to have been punished under Administrative Code Article 24.23 (“Violation of the procedure for organising or conducting a mass event or demonstration”) for exercising freedom of religion or belief without state permission. Punishments are a fine of up to 100 base units (about two months’ average wage), or community service, or 15 days’ imprisonment.

The 11 individuals known to have been punished in 2023, according to decisions seen by Forum 18:

– 28 April 2023, seven young Protestants sharing faith on the streets, Minsk’s Central District Court, each fined between 90 and 100 base units, between 3,330 and 3,700 Belarusian Roubles

– 2 June 2023, Council of Churches Baptist Vladimir Burshtyn who held outdoor meeting, Drogichin District Court, Brest Region, 15 base units, 555 Belarusian Roubles

– 26 July 2023, leader of an unregistered Church, Molodechno District Court, Minsk Region, fined 25 base units, 925 Belarusian Roubles

– 15 September 2023, Orthodox Christian Nikolai Bondar for leading pilgrimage, Beshenkovichi District Court, Vitebsk Region, fined 20 base units, 740 Belarusian Roubles

– 2023, religious believer, led outdoor religious event without state permission, 10 day jail term

This compares with at least 8 individuals (seven of them Protestants, including Pastor Goncharenko of New Life Church, and one of traditional folk beliefs) known to have been punished under Administrative Code Article 24.23 in 2022.

Source

8 December 2023

A Roman Catholic believer from Maladziečna, Pavel Kuchynski, was arrested and detained on 26 January 2022 for publishing critical comments online. On 7 June 2022, the Vilejka District court sentenced him to five years in a penal colony. He was charged under the following articles of the Criminal Code: 369 (Insulting a representative of authority), 389 (Threat against a judge), 368 (Insulting the President of Belarus), 391 (Insulting a judge or a lay judge), 364 (Threat of violence against a representative of authority). On 2 September 2022, following the appeal, the Minsk Regional Court reduced his imprisonment by three months – to 4 years and 9 months. At the same time, a fine of 120 basic units (1,570 Euros) was added. On 13 April 2022, the Christian Vision group issued a statement protesting the depriving of Kuchynski of vital medical care. Since then, the health condition of the believer who suffers from a terminal oncological Hodgkin’s lymphoma worsened further. He received the status of the first grade disability, that is, the most debilitating one according to the Belarusian classification.

Kuchynski requires immediate release on humanitarian grounds. He has been sent to the prison hospital in Kaliadzičy for a course of chemotherapy. Although he is receiving medical care, the current treatment is not sufficient, and his disease is progressing. According to medics, Kuchynski requires a bone marrow transplant; this cannot be performed in prison. To save his life and for the opportunity of further treatment the absence of which would lead to his premature death, the 29-year-old Kuchynski filed a petition for pardon addressed to Alexander Lukashenko. His petition, however, has not been forwarded to the addressee. Every day of delay could cost Kuchynski his life.

We express our concern about Pavel Kuchynsky’s health condition and the lack of the necessary timely therapy for his progressing oncological disease, in particular, bone marrow transplantation.

We ask the criminal executive body, in whose jurisdiction Kuchynski is currently, to make all the necessary steps for providing the political prisoner with the complete necessary and timely medical care, in accordance with the recommendations of his attending physician, including bone marrow transplantation.

We ask the current authorities in Belarus to release Pavel Kuchynski, who suffers from serious illness and disability, on humanitarian grounds or, at least, to replace his punishment with a non-custodial one; or to grant him conditional early release from serving his sentence due to the need for medical treatment.

We appeal to the Conference of Catholic Bishops of Belarus to help with drawing attention to the situation of Catholic believer Pavel Kuchynsky and to petition the authorities to provide him with the necessary pastoral and medical care, including bone marrow transplantation.

We also appeal to the representative of the Holy See in Belarus, the Apostolic Nuncio Archbishop Ante Jozic, to make all possible diplomatic efforts for obtaining comprehensive information about the condition of political prisoner and Catholic believer Pavel Kuchynski; and for ensuring his rights, including the right to receive medical care the lack of which would cause premature death.

We draw the attention of the global Christian community to the situation of Catholic believer Pavel Kuchynski and call for solidarity and prayer.

By Dylan Schexnaydre, Researcher, UNITED STATES COMMISSION on INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

December 2023

Overview

The religious freedom situation in Belarus continues to deteriorate as Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka subjugates every aspect of social life to the state’s security and bureaucratic apparatuses. Following popular protests against the fraudulent 2020 election which kept President Lukashenka in power, authorities launched a brutal and ongoing crackdown on civil society that has transformed the country into a totalitarian state, with the government perceiving any activities independent of its control as a threat to its existence. The government has banned or shut down independent media, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and opposition political parties and criminalized engaging with these organizations. Law enforcement has regularly imprisoned, tortured, denied medical care to, and killed prodemocracy protesters, opposition politicians, journalists, and human rights activists for peacefully expressing their views, assembling, or documenting government abuses.

The state has not exempted religious communities from this overwhelming pressure and has sought to re-exert its authority to regulate religious affairs. In 2023, Belarus’ parliament considered adopting a new religion law that would impose stricter requirements on religious communities and unjustifiably prohibit them from certain religious and political activities. Law enforcement agencies harass Protestants who conduct ordinary religious activities without state approval, and local authorities pressure Roman Catholics by targeting their houses of worship, including Minsk’s iconic Church of Saints Simon and Helena (also known as the Red Church). Christian religious leaders of all denominations are often detained, fined, imprisoned, and forced into exile for activities that the state perceives as political in nature. From 2004 to 2012, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) had previously placed Belarus on its tier two “Watch List” for its government’s violations of religious freedom.

This country update provides an overview of religious freedom conditions in Belarus in 2023, including the impact of expanding government repression on religious communities.

Religious Demographics

The U.S. government estimates that Belarus has a population of 9.4 million. According to a 2016 survey by Belarus’ State Information and Analytical Center of the Presidential Administration, 53 percent of the country’s adult population belongs to the Belarusian Orthodox Church, 6 percent belongs to the Roman Catholic Church, 8 percent identifies as atheist, and 22 percent identifies as “uncertain.” Other religious groups constituting less than 2 percent of the population include Jews, Muslims, Greek Catholics, Old Believers, other Orthodox Christians, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Protestants, members of the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, and many others. Roughly 3 percent of Belarus’ population consists of ethnic Poles, who are predominately Roman Catholic.

New Religion Law and Other Legal Developments

2002 and 2023 Religion Laws

For over two decades, the Belarusian state has sought to systematically regulate religious life in the country — albeit to varying degrees. While Belarus’ 2002 law On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations (religion law) guaranteed freedom of religion or belief to all citizens, it also imposed several burdensome bureaucratic measures that religious groups must adhere to in order to conduct their activities legally. This included registering their activities with the state, limiting the locations where religious activities could occur without prior government approval, and subjecting religious materials used by missionaries to review. Authorities could also liquidate religious communities for carrying out activities perceived as against the country’s “sovereignty” among other reasons. However, prior to the 2020 protests, government officials typically refrained from strict enforcement of the law and instead engaged in administrative harassment and bureaucratic obstruction such as not approving religious registration applications or materials consistently or in a timely manner.

In June 2023, authorities introduced a new, more repressive religion law in an apparent attempt to reconsolidate control over religious communities. The June draft law recycled and modified several problematic articles found in the current law and introduced new requirements and restrictions for religious communities. In October 2023, the parliament began considering a modified version of the June draft called “On Amendments to Laws on the Activities of Religious Organizations” that maintained most of the provisions of the original draft. Moreover, the new religion law provides the government with a pretext to effectively ban certain religious communities and eliminate elements of religious society that the state perceives as challenging its authority.

The new proposed religion law would require religious communities to re-register with the state within a year. To register, each community must submit an application with its charter, documentation of its right to gather at the location specified in its charter, and the personal information, including the full names, phone numbers, and home and work addresses, of at least 20 members who are over the age of 18. While the previous religion law required the same information, the current crackdown on civil society raises concerns that the government may misuse the information to target religious community members or that some communities would withhold the information due to those fears, resulting in the denial of their registration. Authorities had previously denied registration to opposition political parties that refused to provide such information due to security concerns during their re-registration process.

The proposed law reaffirms Belarus’ tiered religious group system that grants larger religious organizations the exclusive rights to establish monasteries, religious missions, and religious educational institutions through an additional registration process. The proposed law does, however, increase the requirements to qualify for these higher tiered statuses. National religious associations must include 15 religious communities operating in all the regions of Belarus and the city of Minsk, with at least one of these communities active in the country for 30 years. The current law only requires a national religious association to list 10 communities operating in at least four of Belarus’ six oblast regions, with one community active for the last 20 years. Regional religious associations must include at least 10 religious communities in one or other nearby regions. The proposed law also explicitly limits religious organizations to conducting charitable activities solely for the elderly, disabled, and citizens suffering from substance abuse. Only monasteries would be able to establish children’s homes for orphans.

The draft law recognizes the special role the Belarusian Orthodox Church has played in the country’s historical, cultural, and spiritual formation. It also emphasizes the importance of the Catholic Church, Lutheran Church, Judaism, and Islam in Belarus. If a religious community previously “unknown” to the government attempts to register, it must submit for state review the group’s religious beliefs and practices, historical development, and views on family, marriage, education, performance of public duties, public health, and restrictions on civil rights and obligations.

The proposed law furthermore requires all religious communities to:

— Display the religious organization’s full name and confessional affiliation when conducting religious activities;

— Submit a notification of the replacement head of a religious community within 10 days of the individual’s appointment; and

— Submit imported missionary literature and other related materials for government review.

The new law would not only require certain actions from religious communities but also prohibit a range of items and activities, including but not limited to:

— Participating in, funding, or supporting political activities;

— Using non-religious symbols in places of worship;

— Engaging in speech that insults government officials or representatives of other religions and their followers in places of worship;

— Using texts and images that incite hatred, offend the “religious feelings” of citizens, or promote other “extremist” activities in places of worship;

— Using religious property in ways not specified in a community’s charter, including for political purposes or carrying out “terrorist” or other “extremist” activities;

— Promoting religious education and related materials that contradict the generally accepted “traditional values” and “ideology” of the Belarusian state or justify the propaganda of war, social, ethnic or religious hatred;

— Conducting religious education in languages other than state recognized ones (Belarusian and Russian);

— Engaging in religious activity without registration;

— Engaging in missionary activities in residential buildings, outside of government-approved locations, or by persons not approved by the governing body of a registered religious community; and

— Distributing religious literature in residential buildings and public transport facilities.

Several key phrases such as “offend religious feelings,” “traditional values,” and “ideology of the Belarusian state” lack clear definitions and could therefore contribute to the criminalization of peaceful expressions of religious beliefs. The state furthermore would have the power to liquidate religious communities for violating these and other vaguely worded prohibited activities, including acting against Belarus’ sovereignty, domestic and foreign policy, constitutional system, and civil harmony; discrediting Belarus and promoting hatred, other extremist activities, and humiliation of national honor and dignity; preventing citizens from fulfilling their state and public duties; and harming the health and morals of citizens.

The retooling of the religion law demonstrates the government’s intent to provide itself with a more encompassing legal framework to regulate religious life and crack down on religious individuals and groups. In August 2023, three United Nations special rapporteurs, including the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief Nazila Ghanea, urged the government to review and reconsider key portions of the June draft religion law that would “fail to meet Belarus’ obligations under international human rights law.” In November 2023, the draft religion law passed its second reading in the parliament.

“Extremist” Materials and Organizations

The Belarusian state has weaponized a wide range of vaguely worded, questionable criminal statutes to punish dissent and decimate independent civil society, with trumped-up charges and restrictions related to so-called “extremism” regularly applied. Belarus’ law On Combating Extremism defines “extremism” very broadly as any activity that threatens the country’s “independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty, and foundations of constitutional order,” without necessarily requiring the use or advocacy of violence. In practice, this ambiguity allows the government to criminalize any activity, speech, expression, and assembly it opposes. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) has labeled “extremist” more than a hundred organizations and 2,000 individuals, and Belarusian courts have designated “extremist” a list exceeding 3,000 materials, which includes printed and online publications, social media pages, and symbols. Citizens can face administrative and criminal prosecution with punishments ranging from fines to lengthy imprisonment for engaging with an organization, individual, or material designated “extremist.” In recent years, authorities have even arrested, fined, and detained Christian religious leaders for “distributing extremist materials,” which will be discussed in greater detail later in this report.

Belarus has designated religious literature, websites, and social media pages affiliated with religious groups, and other religious content as “extremist” materials. In the last year, courts have declared extremist a YouTube interview with an exiled Roman Catholic priest, the book Interpretation of the Ten Last Juz of the Noble Qur’an, Greek Catholic news website Tsarkva, and several materials belonging to the Pentecostal New Life Church, including its website, social media pages, and a prayer that mentioned government human rights abuses.

Between August and September 2023, various courts declared “extremist” the social media pages and symbol of Christian Vision, a Christian group that provides commentary on religious freedom in Belarus and documents human rights violations against Belarusian religious leaders, religious lay persons, and religious communities.

Authorities have also declared “extremist” several independent media outlets and human rights organizations that regularly report on religious freedom and other human rights issues within Belarus. In late 2021, the MoIA added independent Belarusian news channel Belsat and U.S. broadcaster Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Belarusian language news service Radio Svaboda to its registry of extremist organizations. Since then, law enforcement agencies have imprisoned affiliated journalists for their work and others — including religious figures — who simply repost their content on social media. In August 2023, the MoIA declared Viasna, the country’s premier human rights organization which regularly reports on human rights violations against religious leaders, an “extremist formation” and included about a hundred websites, accounts, materials, and information tied to Viasna as “extremist.” Five of Viasna’s members, including chairperson and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski, remain in prison on political charges tied to their human rights work.

Other Administrative and Criminal Offenses

Other legislation and elements of Belarus’ administrative and criminal codes remain problematic for the free exercise of religion or belief. For example, law enforcement agencies have fined several religious leaders and other persons engaging in religious activities for organizing a “mass event” without government permission, which will be highlighted further in the next section. Following amendments to the state’s Mass Events Law that went into effect in June 2021, organizers of so-called “mass events” must get approval from authorities prior to advertising an event. Violations of the law can result in administrative detention, fines, and up to three years’ imprisonment.

In January 2022, the country reinstated a criminal statute that authorities had abolished three years prior to punish activity in unregistered or forcibly dissolved nongovernmental organizations, including religious organizations, with fines or up to two years’ imprisonment. Additionally, authorities have reportedly threatened to charge those who publicly share their religious beliefs with others with “incitement of racial, ethnic, religious or other social hatred,” which entails a penalty of up to five years in prison.

New Life Church and Other Protestant Communities

Protestant communities refusing to submit to the state’s strict regime of control have faced surveillance, harassment, detention, fines, and various other obstacles to or punishments for their religious activities. Among the religious groups enduring the most repression in Belarus is the Pentecostal New Life Church, which has had a zoning dispute with authorities over its church property since 2002. In recent years, the government ramped up its targeting of New Life Church after the latter took a public stance, including through prayer, to support the protest movement that emerged after the 2020 fraudulent election and criticize state officials involved in human rights abuses and violence against protesters. In February 2021, police forcibly evicted New Life Church from its building during religious services. In September 2022, authorities detained New Life Church Pastor Vyacheslav Goncharenko and fined him 3,200 rubles ($973) for holding religious services in the parking lot beside the closed church. Authorities also detained Pastor Antoni Bokun, a Baptist pastor from another church who participated in the service, and fined him the same amount. Both pastors were charged with organizing an unauthorized mass event.

In June 2023, authorities bulldozed New Life Church and the following month blocked the group’s website for a period of six months, accusing it of publishing “extremist” information and “building up threats to national security.” That same month, New Life Church received an official government letter renewing demands that it owed 458,918 rubles ($139,516) in taxes. In August 2023, 20 armed police officers reportedly searched Pastor Goncharenko’s home and detained him and Ilya Budai, Goncharenko’s son-in-law and New Life Church’s youth pastor. A court later sentenced Goncharenko to 10 days of administrative detention and Budai to five days for disobeying police and disorderly conduct, respectively. Courts then declared “extremist” New Life Church’s website, social media pages, and the materials posted on those pages, including prayers that condemned Belarusian officials involved in human rights violations. In September 2023, the Minsk City Executive Committee initiated proceedings to liquidate New Life Church for violating the country’s religion law on account of its so-called “extremist” activities. In October 2023, a court in Minsk liquidated New Life Church.

Courts have imposed various punishments on members of other Protestant denominations for their unauthorized religious activities. In July 2022, a court fined Pastor Dmitry Podlobko 640 rubles ($195) for performing outdoor baptisms on his family’s privately owned property. In August 2022, a Gomel court fined two members of another Protestant church 640 rubles ($195) each for holding unauthorized baptisms. In April 2023, police in Minsk detained seven members of several Protestant denominations — the majority from New Life Church — for talking about their religious beliefs with passers-by. The Central District Court in Minsk subsequently fined them each between 3,330 ($1,012) and 3,700 rubles ($1,125). In May 2023, police in Drogichin detained several members of the Baptist Council of Churches for talking about their faith in the city’s main square and passing out religious literature. A judge later fined one of those Baptists, septuagenarian Vladimir Burshtyn, 555 rubles ($169). In July 2023, the Malorita District Prosecutor summoned Burshtyn and allegedly threatened to criminally prosecute him for inciting hatred if he continued to share his beliefs in public.

Roman Catholic Churches and Other Religious Groups

Authorities in recent years have imposed arbitrary restrictions and numerous fees on religious communities for using government-owned religious buildings — measures that Roman Catholics perceive as intended to pressure their community. The 2020 protests exacerbated tensions between the Roman Catholic Church and the Belarusian government, as the government viewed the Church and its clergy as actively supporting the opposition.

In September 2022, government officials closed Minsk’s Roman Catholic Church of Saints Simon and Helena (the Red Church) after a mysterious fire broke out in a small annex. Since then, the church has remained closed for government-ordered repairs, despite eyewitness reports of minimal damage limited to the sacristy. Officials have provided no timetable for the completion of repairs and have forbidden parishioners from using the church and its surrounding areas for customary religious activities. Many believe the church’s indefinite closure to be tied to the role it played during the country’s 2020 protests when protesters rallied at and even fled into the church for protection from police violence.

Law enforcement agencies have sometimes prohibited religious activities at or near the Red Church since its closure, citing the prohibition on mass events. In October 2022, police reportedly harassed the parish’s priest and a group of parishioners praying the rosary outside of the church. In April 2023, officials rejected the parish’s request to hold Easter services in the parish rectory, and in May 2023, the parish announced it would not participate in the Minsk Corpus Christi procession for undisclosed reasons.

The state also refuses to hand over Roman Catholic churches seized during the Soviet period. Instead, it has reportedly imposed rent on parishes or charged them for unrequested renovations that do not meet the communities’ needs. Prior to the closure of the Red Church, city officials had been charging the parish roughly 13,000 rubles ($3,952) a month in rent, and by July 2020, the Red Church reportedly owed more than 160,000 rubles ($48,642) in taxes and for restoration work. In January 2023, the parish priest of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary Church in Babruysk announced the parish would begin paying an undisclosed amount of money to the government to rent the church, despite not having to pay rent previously. Officials allegedly threatened to give the church to a museum and furthermore restrict parishioners’ ability to use the church for religious purposes if they did not enter into a rental agreement.Officials had imposed rent on other Roman Catholic churches under similar threats. Such agreements have not been made public.

In July 2023, police raided the Cathedral of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Minsk and beat priests who refused to let them search their phones for incriminating materials. The raid came after security forces arrested a catechist affiliated with the church in May for disseminating “extremist” materials. Two of the church’s priests, Yury Reshetko and Valery Dovgil, reportedly fled Belarus after the raid.

Authorities continued to prevent the Old Believer community in Minsk from building a church. In March 2022, the Minsk Region Executive Committee rejected an Old Believer application to build a church, forcing the community to continue to travel outside of Minsk to gather for worship.

Clergy and Laity Targeted for Perceived Political Activities

According to Christian Vision, the state has detained, fined, imprisoned, pushed out of their positions, or forced into exile at least 60 religious leaders of the Belarusian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and various Protestant churches since the 2020 crackdown began. Such targeting of clergy has often come as a result of their perceived political activities — reflecting a broader trend of oppression facing all Belarusians. Belarus is estimated to have approximately 1,500 political prisoners.

In December 2022, Belarusian Orthodox priest Uladzislau Bahamolnikau was released after spending more than 90 days in pretrial detention for sending “extremist resources” to his mother. According to Christian Vision, Bahamolnikau endured harsh living conditions and caught COVID-19 while detained. In January 2023, police detained Belarusian Orthodox priest Dionisy Korostelev for praying in church for Ukrainian forces. The Belarusian Orthodox Church leadership subsequently banned him from religious services. In April 2023, the Centralny District Court of Minsk sentenced the elder at the New Earth Baptist Church, Andrei Mamoika, and his wife Vera, to two-and-a-half years of restricted freedom under home confinement for publishing online photos of the 2020 protests. That same month, authorities in Novalukoml detained and sentenced to 15 days’ administrative arrest Aleksandr Zaretski, pastor of the city’s Evangelical Church, for liking and commenting on materials recognized as “extremist.”

In May 2023, law enforcement across the Viciebsk region detained on the same day one Greek Catholic and two Roman Catholic priests in relation to their social media activity. Both Roman Catholic priest Viachaslau Adamovich and Greek Catholic priest Aliaksandar Shautsou faced charges of disseminating “extremist” materials and organizing an unauthorized mass event, with Shautsou spending 45 days in jail. In June 2023, riot police in Mogilev violently detained Pastor Siarhey Udalyou of the Evangelical Reformed “Calvinist Gathering” Church, reportedly in connection with his political activities or religious training in Ukraine. He was later released under unclear circumstances. In July 2023, a court in Navahrudak fined Roman Catholic priest Yury Zhegarin 555 rubles ($169) and confiscated his phone after police charged him with disseminating “extremist” materials for liking a Radio Svaboda article on social media in 2021. In August 2023, police detained Roman Catholic priest Antoni Adamovich and searched his church’s rectory after interrogating him and confiscating his phone. Police had tried to arrest him inside the church, but parishioners stopped them. A week later, it was revealed authorities charged Adamovich with distributing “extremist” materials.

Non-clergy political prisoners have also experienced violations of their freedom of religion or belief while in prison. Belsat noted that since the beginning of the nationwide crackdown, prisoners’ rights to access religious materials and participate in religious activities have been based on the arbitrary whims and regulations of individual prison administrators, with some denying, prohibiting, or confiscating religious items including Bibles, religious books and magazines, crosses, rosaries, and even Christmas cards. Prisoners have also been denied visits from clergy. On the rare occasions when such visits are approved, they are often heavily restricted or make certain religious activities like administering the sacrament difficult or impossible. Catholics and Protestants have reportedly faced more challenges than Orthodox prisoners as the Belarusian Orthodox Church maintains its own facilities in prisons and generally has greater access.

Conclusion

The decline in the freedom of religion or belief in Belarus is of grave concern. President Lukashenka’s government continues to severely repress civil society and ramp up efforts to regulate religious life. As the U.S. administration and Congress seek to address Belarus’ human rights concerns, they must prioritize the burgeoning crackdown on religious communities as part of those efforts.

Source