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	<title>Майдан &#8211; Царква і палітычны крызіс у Беларусі</title>
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	<title>Майдан &#8211; Царква і палітычны крызіс у Беларусі</title>
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		<title>Nicholas Denysenko. Orthodoxy in Belarus at the Crossroads of Human Dignity and the Status Quo</title>
		<link>https://belarus2020.churchby.info/nicholas-denysenko-orthodoxy-in-belarus-at-the-crossroads-of-human-dignity-and-the-status-quo/</link>
		
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		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2020 00:27:06 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Майдан]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[мітрапаліт Веніямін (Тупека)]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[Responding to:&#160;Orthodoxy in the Belarus Protests The protests in Belarus taking place in the aftermath of the presidential election have taken a dark turn with reports of brutality and torture used by riot police. Religious leaders are playing an important role in responding to the civil unrest. While some faith leaders are demonstrating their public [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Responding to:&nbsp;<a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/posts/orthodoxy-in-the-belarus-protests">Orthodoxy in the Belarus Protests</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The protests in Belarus taking place in the aftermath of the presidential election have taken a dark turn with reports of brutality and torture used by riot police. Religious leaders are playing an important role in responding to the civil unrest. While some faith leaders are demonstrating their public solidarity with the protestors, there is immense pressure on the Belarusian Orthodox Church (BOC, an exarchate of the Moscow Patriarchate) to advocate for the protection of fundamental human rights in the midst of a series of political injustices.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is tempting to draw a parallel between the role of the Orthodox Church in the Belarus crisis and the Ukrainian Maidan (Revolution of Dignity) originating in 2013, but there are significant differences. Orthodox Ukrainians initiated a movement for an autocephalous (independent) church, completely free from Russian control, as early as 1917. The autocephalous movement returned to Ukraine at the end of the Soviet period and played an important role in expressing public support for Ukrainian sovereignty. Clergy and laity of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and autocephalist churches demonstrated their solidarity with the protestors at the height of the Maidan. Russia’s response to the Maidan—the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas—hastened the creation of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) that has the support of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and recognition from two of the world’s Orthodox churches.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The BOC has not followed the path of church independence pursued by Ukrainians. It is helpful to compare the responses of the Moscow Patriarchate (MP) to political movements in Belarus and Ukraine to illuminate the differences and similarities between the two situations.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In 1990, the MP elevated the canonical (legal) statute of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine from an exarchate to a church with broad autonomy in its self-governance. The MP initiated this change to stop the migration of clergy and parishes from the MP to the resurgent autocephalous movement that had returned in 1989, and also to give the appearance of non-interference from Moscow.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The BOC continues to be an exarchate of the MP. On August 25, the BOC’s leader, Metropolitan Paul, tendered his resignation. The MP elected and appointed Bishop Veniamin, a native of Belarus, as the new head of the BOC. This appointment is strategic, similar to the MP’s actions taken in 1966. At that time, the MP appointed Filaret (Denysenko), a native of Ukraine, as the new metropolitan of Kyiv. Filaret’s appointment occurred as the MP attempted to assert control over former Greek Catholics in West Ukraine, who were forced to become Orthodox during the Council of L’viv in 1946 orchestrated by Stalin and his henchmen. The MP appointed Filaret to grant the appearance that Ukrainians were governing their own church. The MP’s appointment of Bishop Veniamin lends the appearance of Russian non-interference in BOC affairs, as it did with the appointment of Filaret in 1966 and the granting of autonomy to his church.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These moves represent the MP’s attempt to keep the large Belarusian and Ukrainian contingents within the official fold of the church. Church spokespeople rationalize such moves as preserving the multinational character of the church and holding nationalism and xenophobia at bay. It is clear, however, that politics are also involved, to retain Belarus and Ukraine as Russian outposts in Eastern Europe. It is no secret that Russia uses its branches in the Orthodox churches in Belarus and Ukraine as fifth columns to maintain the unity of the so-called&nbsp;<em>Russkii Mir&nbsp;</em>(Russian world).&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Two options are available to both the MP and the newly elected Bishop Veniamin. They can sustain the status quo by issuing statements that call for peace and promote nonviolence without explicit criticism of Lukashenko. There is a strong chance that state force will restore order, and minimal disruption to the life of the church will be the immediate reward.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The second choice is more risky. Church leaders can demonstrate their solidarity with the protestors by defending their human rights and implicating Lukashenko. While the apparatuses of state and church would certainly penalize them for this course, they could gain the trust of the people.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The MP’s “<a href="https://mospat.ru/en/documents/dignity-freedom-rights/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights</a>” calls for defending human rights when there is “concern for a just and economic and social order of society.” The Ecumenical Patriarchate’s recent social ethics teaching,&nbsp;<em><a href="https://www.goarch.org/social-ethos" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">For the Life of the World</a></em>, states that the Orthodox Church can “lend its voice to the call to protect and advance human rights everywhere,” including violations of people’s civil rights and justice. A decision to defend the civil rights of protestors would therefore be anchored in the teaching tradition of the Orthodox Church.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The uncertain future outcome of standing with the people is a likely source of fear for the church. The MP miscalculated Ukrainian resistance to Russian domination and lost the loyalty of at least half of Ukraine’s Orthodox believers in the process. A second miscalculation in Belarus seems unlikely, especially in the absence of a strong movement for church independence.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The great risk to church leaders responsible for Belarus, however, is to misunderstand the significance of trust by the people. The protestors have already demonstrated their resilience in the face of brutal state force. A movement for an autocephalous BOC seems impossible, but the Ukrainian case shows that there are now multiple models of autocephaly in the Orthodox world. If national statehood and independence symbolized Orthodox autocephaly in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the OCU shows that liberation from an aggressive foreign tyrant is a legitimate reason for autocephaly in the twenty-first century.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The strategy of sustaining the status quo at all costs, including defending human rights, might be successful for Belarusian Orthodox Church and state officials in the short term. Losing the trust of the public could cost them dearly in the long run. Bishop Veniamin&nbsp;<a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://mospat.ru/en/2020/08/27/news186043/" target="_blank">instructed the people</a>&nbsp;to pray and fast for divine assistance in his inaugural appeal. It is likely that church leaders will need to go beyond spiritual appeals and take stronger action to help resolve this crisis.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Nicholas Denysenko serves as Emil and Elfriede Jochum Professor and Chair at Valparaiso University. Denysenko is a graduate of the University of Minnesota (B.S. in Business, 1994), St. Vladimir’s Orthodox Theological Seminary (M.Div., 2000), and The Catholic University of America (Ph.D., 2008). His most recent books are&nbsp;The People’s Faith: The Liturgy of the Faithful in Orthodoxy&nbsp;(2018) and&nbsp;The Orthodox Church in Ukraine: A Century of Separation&nbsp;(2018).</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/orthodoxy-in-belarus-at-the-crossroads-of-human-dignity-and-the-status-quo">Berkley Center for Religion, Peace &amp; World Affairs</a></p>
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		<title>Cyril Hovorun. The Belarusian Protests and the Orthodox Church</title>
		<link>https://belarus2020.churchby.info/cyril-hovorun-the-belarusian-protests-and-the-orthodox-church/</link>
		
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		<pubDate>Fri, 28 Aug 2020 09:00:43 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Аналітыка, каментарыі]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Праваслаўная Царква]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Берклі]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Кірыл Гаварун]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Майдан]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[Responding to:&#160;Orthodoxy in the Belarus Protests In Russia, there is a widely spread superstition that August brings national-scale catastrophes. The mass protests in Belarus against Alyaksandr Lukashenka are seen as such a catastrophe for the regime of Vladimir Putin. Even though Mr. Lukashenka struggled to preserve some independence for his country from Russia, Belarus under [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Responding to:&nbsp;<a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/posts/orthodoxy-in-the-belarus-protests">Orthodoxy in the Belarus Protests</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Russia, there is a widely spread superstition that August brings national-scale catastrophes. The mass protests in Belarus against Alyaksandr Lukashenka are seen as such a catastrophe for the regime of Vladimir Putin. Even though Mr. Lukashenka struggled to preserve some independence for his country from Russia, Belarus under his rule represented the model of a Neo-Soviet colony that Russia has tried to impose on its neighbors since Putin’s presidency began. Belarus under Mr. Lukashenka preserved many symbols and most of the ethos of the Soviet era.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The key feature of the Soviet ethos is paternalism, which means that the regime offers its subjects basic social welfare in exchange for complete obedience. The Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity in 2014 (also known as the Maidan), for example, was a revolt against this sort of paternalism. What is going on now in Belarus looks more like a revolution that started within the paternalistic framework. There are good signs, however, that eventually the Belarusian revolution will turn against paternalism as such.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is not going to be easy. For the many years that he has been in power (since 1994), Mr. Lukashenka offered the Belarusians a social contract: their complete obedience in exchange for paternalistic basic welfare and an illusion of stability. Now this social contract is broken. Most Belarusians believe that it was Lukashenka who broke it by the way he treated them in the last days. Several Belarusians were killed by the regime and thousands tortured with unprecedented cruelty. Lukashenka, in his turn, believes that the Belarusians broke the contract by not obediently accepting the results of the elections, which he does not even pretend to present as fair.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It seems, however, that the paternalistic contract was broken earlier. One of Lukashenka’s serious mistakes that made many Belarusians think he was unable to fulfill the contract was his demonstrative ignorance of COVID-19. He publicly mocked those who took the pandemic seriously and forced people into the situations wherein they could easily contract the coronavirus. For example, on May 9, he gathered crowds for the Victory Parade in Minsk. Even Mr. Putin decided not to have such a parade in Moscow and was irritated by Mr. Lukashenka’s initiative. In the meantime, the health system in Belarus was suffocated by the high numbers of COVID-19 patients, and the state did not seem to care. People had to take care of themselves and the suffering coronavirus patients—pretty much outside the social contract they believed they had with Lukashenka. It seems that COVID-19, or rather ignoring it, has challenged dictators on both sides of the Atlantic.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is very tempting to compare the Belarusian protests with the Ukrainian Maidan. Belarusians do not like such comparisons—for various reasons. Many have been brainwashed by the official Russian and Belarusian propagandas, which concurred in condemning the Maidan. Others do not like to stay in the shadow of the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity. There are indeed many similarities and dissimilarities between the two revolutions, which it is now not a good time to analyze. There is, however, a parallel, which is worthy exploring: between the attitudes of the churches.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2014 and now made the same mistake of publicly supporting the unpopular dictators. Such support stems from the policy of Patriarch Kirill, which he always had even before he became the Patriarch, to focus on political elites and ignore masses. This policy repaid him with some popularity among those in power but created a chasm between him and the ordinary flocks, first in Ukraine and now in Belarus. The same chasm between the lay and hierarchy is widening in Russia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Following in the steps of the Patriarch, the church leadership in Belarus demonstrated the same blindness to the masses’ demands. For example, the statement by the synod of the Belarusian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate on August 15 only vaguely condemned violence, without identifying the perpetrators, and, more importantly, kept complete silence on the reasons of the mass unrest. Only a couple of hierarchical voices were raised against the injustice of Lukashenka’s regime, with the loudest and most eloquent one by the Archbishop of Grodno and Volkovysk Artemy. Much more outspoken appears to be the Catholic Church in Belarus. Its Metropolitan Archbishop Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz, together with other Catholic bishops, has clearly identified and condemned the perpetrators of violence and injustice. Catholic hierarchs openly supported the people who rose against the regime. The standpoint of the Catholic Church in Belarus is very similar to the standpoint of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine in 2014.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There is another similarity between Ukraine and Belarus that I cannot skip: the ecumenical character of the protests. Like the Maidan in Ukraine was an ecumenical event, where people of different confessions and even religions stood next to each other and prayed together, so lay people and some clergy from different Christian denominations came together in Belarus in the same religious processions. On August 18, Archbishop Kondrusiewicz led an ecumenical prayer in Minsk, with the participation of representatives from various churches and religious groups, including an Orthodox priest. The Belarusian protests, thus, although they pursue political goals, clearly feature a religious agenda. They are not secular like most political protests in the West. In this, they are similar to the Ukrainian Maidan, which inspired even a specific “Ukrainian public theology.” I hope a “Belarusian public theology” will emerge as a reflection on what is happening in the country now.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">​<em>Editor&#8217;s Note: This post was&nbsp;originally published on August 20, 2020 by&nbsp;</em><a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://publicorthodoxy.org/2020/08/20/belarusian-protests-and-orthodox-church/" target="_blank">Public Orthodoxy</a><em>, a publication of the&nbsp;<a rel="noreferrer noopener" href="https://www.fordham.edu/info/23001/orthodox_christian_studies_center" target="_blank">Orthodox Christian Studies Center</a>&nbsp;of Fordham University.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Archimandrite Cyril Hovorun is professor of ecclesiology, international relations, and ecumenism at&nbsp;Sankt Ignatius Theological Academy and the Stockholm School of Theology.&nbsp;Ordained in the Orthodox Church,&nbsp;Hovorun previously served as acting director of the&nbsp;Huffington Ecumenical Institute at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles. His main fields of expertise are early Christian traditions, ecclesiology, and public theology.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/the-belarusian-protests-and-the-orthodox-church">Berkley Center for Religion, Peace &amp; World Affairs</a></p>
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